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In 1957, the U.S. Pish and Wildlife Service made a grant of $25,000 
to the Maine Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries in response to an 
application by Marine Research Director, Robert L. Dow, to undertake 
a joint biological and economic study of the Maine lobster fishery.
With the approval of the grantor, a sub-contract was executed with the 
Economics Department of Bowdoin College to research the economic aspects 
of the fishery. Pontecorvo and Storer prepared the following document 
as their contribution.
THE MARKETING OF LOBSTERS
THE MAINE DEALERS
With the commercialization of the live lobster fishery in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, the lobster dealer rapidly emerged, dis­
tinguished by his performance of the essential functions of purchase, 
storage, transfer, and distribution. In large part, these functions are 
derived from the geographical dispersion and isolation of the lobster 
fishermen along the Maine coast, together with the relative concentration 
of consumption in the northeastern urban area that has been serviced to 
a very large degree through the Boston and New York markets.
In this sense, the dealer does nothing with the product itself (except 
to try to preserve its life until sold). Rather, he concerns himself with 
the purchase of the lobsters at a favorable price, storing them and eventually 
selling in the market under the most favorable terms he can obtain.
Reference has already been made in Chapter II to the reported arrival 
in 1826 of the two smacks, the Luna and the Pelee, off the shore of Bailey 
Island. ^
1. See Chapter II, page 2.
The appearance of these smacks from Connecticut is the first evidence of the 
emergence of the dealer in live lobsters along the Maine coast. Though these 
"alien" smacks met with some opposition from the more conservative local 
fishermen, the possibility of an expanded market was not wasted on most of
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the younger men. Not only did they sell lobsters to the smacks, but some of 
the more affluent bought smacks and became dealers themselves, buying from 
their neighbors and shipping the lobsters to the markets in Boston and else­
where.^
2. It is not intended to imply that prior to the arrival of the Connecticut 
smacks there had been no sale of lobsters. Earlier, however, the sale had 
been on a limited local basis.
Since its establishment early in the nineteenth century, the role of the 
dealer has tended to remain essentially unchanged.
A better appreciation of the role of the various lobster dealers and 
buyers operating in Maine can be obtained by describing, in some detail, 
their operations and functions.
At the bottom, in terms of their size and the scope of their operations, 
are the small lobster buyers carrying on their business at the ends of wharves 
in any number of small harbors along the coast. The minimum amount of equip­
ment needed by one of these buyers is some of the slatted crates that usually
hold about one hundred pounds of lobsters. The chances are good that he will
3also have a lobster car.
3. See Chapter III, pp. 8ff. for a more complete description of this and 
other storage devices.
The small buyer may have on the wharf a shed in which he stores the small 
amount of gear he has, some of which - line, gloves, etc. - may be available 
for sale to the lobstermen. A few barrels of bait, redfish or herring waste, 
depending upon the location along the coast, complete his physical capital
investment.
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The practice of paying lobstermen cash at the time of sales is almost 
universal. Equally well established is the practice of extending credit to 
the lobstermen for gear, bait, and other supplies. For these reasons, the 
buyer must have a certain amount of money capital. (However, inadequate 
capital resources is the primary limiting factor on the small buyer's activi­
ties. )
The small buyer may be an independent businessman selling to the local 
retail trade as well as to other dealers who in turn will ship and sell to 
the urban markets. He may also do some selling directly to fish and lobster 
dealers in the Boston or New York markets. At least a few of the small 
buyers in Maine have been able, by means of establishing a reputation for a 
quality product, to obtain a higher price for their lobsters in New York.
To do this, however, not only requires the requisite standards in buying, 
grading and packing lobsters, but it also requires a knowledge of the New 
York or Boston market, as well as adequate capital.4
4. For example, one of the smaller family dealerships in the Casco Bay area 
has established a successful business on the premise that there is a signifi­
cant difference in the quality of lobsters. Aside from the influence of the 
season, this dealer ascribes importance to the area fished and purchases 
lobsters from only those fishermen who fish in the outside waters. These 
lobsters, it is asserted, are hardier, more vigorous, and are better able 
to withstand the shipping. Furthermore, their meat content, it is claimed, 
is higher than that of lobsters caught in the upper reaches of the bays, 
inlets, and coves. Thus, this dealer, by having established a reputation 
for a quality and standardized product, is able to obtain a higher price 
in the New York market.
A dealer, for instance, who does not grade his lobsters but merely for­
wards his lobsters as they are purchased, and who has limited, if any, storage 
facilities, is put in a poor bargaining position in the market. He cannot 
keep his lobsters for any significant period of time nor can he obtain any
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better price by virtue of a differentiated and quality product. Thus, he is 
forced to dump his lobsters on the market at peak catch periods, adding to 
the price instability that has been so marked in the industry. The inade­
quacy of capital and need for cash is an additional factor that causes some 
buyers to sell their supply regardless of price or the condition of the 
market.
Actually, these limitations force many of the buyers to be merely
commission agents of other dealers. In such cases, though they may own their
own wharves and cars, they will rely on their principal to provide the capital
for purchase of lobsters and extension of credit. In turn they must sell
virtually all of their lobsters to the dealer at a markup of usually five 
5cents per pound.
5. In the last few years this spread has increased from 3-3% cents each to 
the present 5 cents.
Sometimes this relationship of agent to principal is stable and lasts many 
years. This is apt to be true in the case of dealers who themselves sell 
direct to hotels, restaurants, or wholesalers and where a guaranteed and 
reliable product is a necessity. Dependable agents are a prerequisite in 
such situations. On the other hand, dealers that are primarily speculators 
on the markets with no sizable direct customer sales do not have to rely on 
a stable and graded supply and are apt to shift from one agent buyer to 
another even within a single season.
The larger dealers use a variety of arrangements in procuring lobsters. 
Firms such as those located in the center of a lobstering area can buy direct­
ly from fishermen at their wharves. They may also have their own smacks 
which operate on a fairly regular schedule through the adjacent islands and
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harbors purchasing lobsters from the fishermen. Firms that have their own 
pounds for storage of lobsters will frequently purchase directly at the 
pound-site from lobstermen as well as through agents.
One of the most important of the functions performed by the dealer is 
that of storing the lobsters. From the viewpoint of the market, storage 
tends to even out the available supply, spreading the heavy catch of the 
summer and fall months throughout the year. Since many of the "shedders" 
caught in the summer are unable to stand shipment and have a low weight, 
high water content, storage and feeding of these lobsters result in an im­
proved and more marketable product.
It is this storage function which also presents the dealer with his 
opportunity for profit, since he will buy as cheaply as possible, holding 
the lobsters as is practicable until he can realize the best price. When 
a dealer has a pound, this holding process will last for some time, possibly 
from early fall until late spring. If tanks and cars constitute his sole 
storage capacity, the lobsters will normally be fed and stored for a much 
shorter period.
The lobster cars that a dealer has are nothing more than large floating 
crates with usually a solid deck to walk on. They are twenty feet or more 
long, fifteen or more feet wide, and three or more feet deep. The sides 
and bottom are slatted in order to induce circulation. They are usually 
moored in a cove or harbor and thus make a convenient place for the dealer 
to buy his lobsters from the lobstermen who pull alongside, sort and store 
them in separate compartments in the car, all in one operation.
Though this is a cheap and easy method of storage, it is not suitable 
for more than short periods. Furthermore, since the car floats, it receives
primarily surface water. If the harbor receives too much fresh water from
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emptying streams, the salinity of the water may be reduced. A more prevalent 
problem in many areas is oil pollution which gives the lobster a "kerosene" 
taste. In such places tanks must be used.
Though the capacity of cars in such lobstering centers as Jonesport and
Stonington exceeds 100,000 pounds, the total capacity in the state is reported
£to be less than a million pounds.
6. See the table on Lobster Storage Capacity in Chapter III.
The storage capacity of tanks in Maine is even less than that of cars 
and as indicated in the table in Chapter III, most of the over 800,000 pounds 
capacity is in the southwestern and central part of the state with Portland 
alone accounting for over 135,000 pounds. In Boston the use of tanks is more 
important with well over 100,000 pounds capacity represented in a single 
dealer's establishment. The tanks themselves are flat and long, usually 
with a capacity of 1,000 pounds, and set in tiers. Clear salt water is con­
tinually piped and circulated in the tanks.
In this fashion a tremendous quantity of lobsters can be stored in a 
small space with maximum availability. The tanks are ideal for sorting and 
classifying the lobsters into various sizes and grades. Individual tanks 
can even be used to provide special treatment for weak lobsters that without 
such care as extra oxygen would be unable to withstand shipment in a live 
state.
In Maine the most important means of storage are the pounds. Indeed, 
Maine has the only pounds in New England, and most of these are located in 
the eastern part of the state where the many coves and inlets provide the
natural environment for a pound. 7
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7. Such a pound does not refer to the many roadside lobster restaurants that 
advertise themselves as "pounds." A "genuine" pound in Maine is a dammed up 
cove or inlet, providing adequate circulation by tidal action of salt water 
and free of pollution and fresh water.
At present there are approximately 44 pounds in operation along the Maine 
. 8coast.
8. Chapter III lists the pounds with their location, capacity, and year built.
The total capacity of these pounds is almost four and a quarter million pounds 
of lobster with over three million of it accounted for by those in Knox, Hancock, 
and Washington counties. The largest single pound in the state will alone ac­
commodate 450,000 pounds of live lobsters.
Although there were a few pounds built during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the first quantitatively important construction came in 
the early years of the twentieth century. The explanation usually given for 
the initial growth in pounds is the increasing preoccupation with the shipments 
of live lobsters that occurred with the closing of the lobster canning industry. 
The shipping trade required some means of storage and allocating the concentrated 
catch over the whole year, and pounds provided a relatively inexpensive and 
logical answer.
Though Maine has the only pounds in New England, a number of the pounds 
are owned, leased, or co-owned by dealers to the west. A Massachusetts company, 
for instance, owns four pounds in Maine with a capacity of 450,000 pounds or 
10.7 per cent of Maine's total pound capacity.^
9. Based on total capacity of 4,190,000 pounds.
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Other pounds, though owned by Maine individuals or firms, are leased to 
dealers in Boston or elsewhere.
The pattern of stocking the pounds varies from firm to firm, in large 
part depending upon the type of customer the dealer supplies. If he has a 
high proportion of direct customers, such as hotels and restaurants, relying 
on him for supply all year long, he must use his pound as a guaranteed source 
of supply in winter and early spring months. Some firms, as a matter of 
custom, follow a regular pattern of stocking the pounds in May and June and 
again in the fall, making withdrawals in July and August if needed, as well 
as from February to early April. Other dealers, who sell most of their lob­
sters in New York or Boston markets, may stock the pound on a more erratic 
pattern, essentially geared to the hopes of making a speculative inventory 
gain by buying cheap and selling dear.^
10. All dealers who stock pounds necessarily take a considerable risk. 
Not only is the risk a matter of price fluctuations, but it is also 
related to the possibility of high mortality of the lobster from disease 
or other causes.
In a study of nine pounds reported in the Dow-Harriman-Scattergood 
article"^
11. Ibid., pp. 4ff.
all nine pounds made a practice of stocking in the fall, only five stocked in 
the spring while only three did so in the summer.
As indicated in the earlier reference to the arrival along the Maine 
coast of the smacks from Connecticut in 1826, an actual function of the dealer 
from the very beginning of the industry was to transport the lobsters from
Maine to the markets outside of the state.
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Smacks, either "dry" or "wet," constituted the earliest means of transpor-
12tation and to some extent they are still used today.
12. As described earlier in Chapter II, "wet" smacks are boats especially 
designed for lobster carrying and have a hold in which sea water freely circu­
lates, providing the same storage conditions as a car. In a "dry" smack there 
are no peculiar storage facilities, the hold being like that of any cargo carrier.
The use of smacks is now pretty much confined to collecting lobsters in 
and around the islands, especially in Penobscot Bay, and transporting lobsters 
to Boston and New York from the Canadian provinces. The high operating and 
maintenance charges together with their limited usefulness has led to the re­
placement of smacks by other transportation methods. A Massachusetts firm 
which used to operate five smacks along the coast has disposed of them in 
favor of its own trucks, using dry hull boats only for its runs from Newfound­
land and Nova Scotia. A number of the lobster dealers have their own trucks, 
employing them not only to pick up lobsters from the fishing area in Maine 
and Canada, but also to deliver lobsters to their various direct customers, 
going as far west as Chicago and St. Louis. Other dealers use public carriers, 
although to a certain extent in recent years there has developed some speciali­
zation since one particular trucking firm now appears to carry the bulk of 
the lobsters from dealers in Maine to the New York market.
Since World War II there has been a very marked shift to the use of 
trucks. This is particularly apparent in shipments to the Fulton Fish Market 
in New York. Table I indicates that of the total 3.7 million pounds of live 
lobsters arriving in the New York market in 1947, 56.7 per cent came by rail 
freight. By 1954 and 1955, rail freight shipments had shrunk to a relatively 
unimportant amount, though the total weight shipped to market had grown to
over 8 million pounds. By 1954 and 1955, 99 per cent of all shipments of
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live lobsters to New York were being made by truck. Table II presents a 
breakdown by point of origin of live lobsters arriving in the Fulton Fish 
Market and again the same concentration upon truck shipments is apparent 
regardless of origin of shipment, i.e. Maine, Massachusetts, or the Canadian 
provinces.13
13. The installation of so-called "tank set ups" into freight cars may in 
the future offset some of the change to truck transportation.
The shift in lobster shipment to truck transporation is part of a general 
trend in all fish products and at present almost ninety per cent of all fish 
shipments to the Fulton Fish Market are made by truck. Faster service, lower 
overall rates, door-to-door pick up and delivery have been the major factors 
in the shift to motor carriers.
The cost of shipping lobster by truck can at times be significantly 
lower than what rail express would be. For instance, shipment of lobsters 
from Rockland to Cleveland by truck costs about five cents per pound, while 
by rail it is at best eighteen cents per pound. Generally, within the New 
England area, it costs about two cents a pound when the dealer's own trucks 
are used.
Along with the shift to trucks as a means of transportation, there has 
come about a cheaper and more satisfactory method of packaging. Formerly, 
twenty-five and fifty-pound barrels were used, with barrels costing $1.75. 
Shipment in this fashion was very expensive, adding about three cents to 
the cost of each lobster. Furthermore, there was the problem of returning 
empty barrels. Quality was affected, especially by the fifty-pound barrels, 
since the pressure of the lobsters upon one another tended seriously to
TABLE I
RECEIPTS OF NORTE ATLANTIC LOBSTERS AT NEW YORK CITY 
BY FORK AND METHOD OF SHIPMENT, 1914-7# 1953-55
Form 0: Method of Shipment
Rail Rail 1 TotalLobster Truck Express Freight Boat"1 Arrivals(thousands of pounds)
Live
1914-7 1069 503 2092 23 3687
1953 8521 h k mm mm 1+1 8606
19514- 8002 1+5 mm • » 1+1 8088
1955 88614. 57 mm m 15 8936
Boiled and/or
frozen
191+7 7 1 -  - -  - 8
1953 21+ -- - - mm mm 21+
1951| 1+ -- mm mm - - 1+
1955 7 — trnmm — 7
Meat, fresh
or frozen
191+7 18 51+ 37 -  - 109
1953 528 5 -« - - 533
1951+ 14-29 6 21+ - - 1+59
1955 799 1 mmmm •• 800
Source: Market News Service. Fish & Wildlife Service. U.S. Dept, of theInterior
1. New York boat landings of lobster are those landed at the Fulton Fish 
Market from offshore draggers. These boats are usually out for fish and 
happen to pick up lobster during their general operations. They are 
employed in the waters off Long Island, Connecticut, Rhode Island and 
New Jersey, They generally land a very large lobster which has little 
commercial value as a live lobster*
TABLE II
RECEIPTS OF "LIVE" NORTE ATLANTIC LOBSTERS 
AT SALT-WATER SECTION OF FULTON FISH MARKET, N.Y.C.  
BY POINT OF ORIGIN AND METHOD OF SHIPMENT
1958
Point of Method of Shipment
Origin
Truck
Rail 
Express 
(thousands
Rail 
Freight 
of pounds)
Boat
Total
Arrivals
Maine"1- 5057 k o — m  mm 5097
Maas • 1A55 rnt mm mmmm mm mm 1U55
N.B. or N.S.2 585 mm • — mm mm 585
Other^ 30 — - - 88 118
TOTAL 9827 lj-0 mm ■— 88 9955
1 . A significant number of lobsters reported as originating from Maine 
may be Canadian lobsters. Almost all the lobsters originating from Mass­
achusetts are Maine or Canadian lobsters. People in the market are of 
the opinion that two thirds of the lobsters reported fi?om Maine and 
Massachusetts are Canadian.
2. Direct shipments from Canada.
3. Includes Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey and New York#
/
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impair the condition of the lobsters packed in the bottom of the barrel.
About four years ago the industry began to use twenty-five pound vege­
table crates. These crates are the standard crates used for fruits and vege­
tables. Initially the crates were very cheap, but more recently the cost has 
risen to about thirty-five cents a crate, or under a cent and a half per 
pound of lobster. Not only are these crates better packing instruments, 
but they are also more convenient since many customers of the wholesalers 
prefer the twenty-five pound package, which obviates the necessity of opening 
and repacking the large barrels. Handling and stacking of the vegetable 
crates in trucks and warehouses is easier, and with fewer lobsters in each 
container, there has been a lower mortality rate.
With the utilization to a limited degree of air shipments, a light­
weight moisture-proofed cardboard container which can be packed, iced, and 
stapled shut, has been developed. Mortality with this type of container 
can be as low as one out of twenty-five lobsters. This reduced mortality 
more than makes up the fifteen cent difference in the total cost of fifty 
cents for each box.
Lobster shipments are made by the 200-odd firms and individuals 
classified as lobster dealers in Maine; and although this total has remained 
fairly constant for some time, there is considerable entrance and exit of 
dealers, especially the smaller ones.^4
14. It is difficult to obtain precise data on the number of dealers and 
their size. The license issued by the state does not require a sufficiently 
high fee ($35) or enough information to assure that all who purchase it are 
primarily lobster dealers.
There is great disparity among the two hundred Maine dealers as to their
size and the nature of their operations. We have broken down this group into
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a three-fold classification: Group A, the largest and for the most part, in­
corporated dealers; B, an intermediate group which has some incorporated orga­
nizations but in which most are unincorporated; C, a third group of small 
dealers and buyers scattered along the coast. At best this is a crude classi­
fication in which there is some overlapping between the groups. The grouping 
rests first of all on general knowledge of operations in the different mar­
kets. Somewhat greater precision is given to the classification by the 
examination of income tax data, information obtained by interviews and data 
derived from the antitrust suit of 1957.
It was not possible to obtain income tax data on the largest firms 
(Group A). However, this group is rather clearly distinguished because of 
its size and reputation and by data obtained by interviews. From this data 
it appears that the structure of the dealers is a loose-knit oligopoly with 
a competitive and highly unstable fringe. One firm is clearly the largest. 
Below this one there is a group of perhaps ten firms whose size is very 
roughly similar. (However, it should be emphasized that classification by 
size is of limited usefulness. Patterns of marketing vary considerably 
and firms of similar size may pursue widely differing policies).
The largest firm (located in Boston) handles approximately 10 million 
pounds of lobster a year, about half of which comes from Canada and half 
from Maine. This firm obtains these lobsters from dealers who are usually 
the company's agents or resident buyers. Whenever the company needs addi­
tional lobsters or whenever in their view the price is right, the company 
purchases additional lobsters from local dealers. Purchases are on a fixed 
mark-up basis. The company has two pounds, one in Maine and one in Canada. 
These two pounds plus extensive tank capacity in Boston give the company 
aggregate storage facilities of perhaps a million pounds. This storage
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capacity is not operated primarily on a fall-spring stocking basis, but 
rather it is utilized whenever a good speculative opportunity presents 
itself.
This firm sells most of its catch in the New York wholesale market, 
although it does sell elsewhere when the price is advantageous or when 
excess inventory must be moved. In addition, the firm is active in 
supplying the Florida market by air.
The speculative, quick turnover basis on which the largest firm 
operates may be contrasted with the operations of what is probably the 
second largest.
This second firm, also a Massachusetts organization, has about
1 s1,200 customers over the United States which it serves regularly.
15. Albany, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Oklahoma City 
are a few of the areas covered.
However, when the company has surplus lobsters, it sells them at the Fulton 
Fish Market or to Boston dealers, and when it must dispose of lobsters 
quickly it sells through retail food chains, usually in Boston where they 
are often used as a very attractive loss leader.
Close connections with so many customers permits this firm to attain 
a degree of price stability which is unusual in the fishery. In the winter 
and early spring months when market prices in New York and Boston are high, 
this firm sells to regular accounts at lower prices. The reverse situation 
is true during the summer glut. This practice requires considerable "account 
education" but when backed by good service, it is apparently successful.
Greater price stability enables the firm to engage in more planning and
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especially to estimate profit margins better.
This firm not only employs salesmen and offers considerable direct 
customer service, but it spends about $100,000 annually on advertising 
and other sales promotional activities. This firm feels strongly that 
its expenditure on sales promotion and customer services help it and the 
industry. However, it must be pointed out that handling a large amount 
of customers is complex and expensive.
In the past few years annual sales have been about $3 million. Most 
of these sales have been to the final purchaser. These sales have involved 
the following capital requirements: "*"®
$ 200,000
300.000
345.000 
25,000
accounts receivable 
to stock pounds 
line of bank credit 
lobsters on premises
$870,000 TOTAL
16. Data supplied by interview.
This company purchases one-third of its lobsters from Maine, one-third 
from Nova Scotia, and one-third from Newfoundland. In Maine and Nova Scotia 
it obtains its lobsters from lobster buyers who have regularly and tradi­
tionally sold to them. The company buys from them on a fixed mark-up com­
mission basis and occasionally advances money. The shipment of lobsters 
from these sources is by company trucks and chartered boats. The company 
trucks pick up regularly from Maine sources and also deliver about half the 
amount which annually originates from Nova Scotia. The remaining Nova 
Scotia lobsters and all Newfoundland lobsters are delivered directly to 
the company's facilities in Massachusetts by dry hull boats. Shipment 
to customers is made by company trucks as far west as St. Louis.
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The large dealers in Maine tend more to pattern their activities on 
the first dealer rather than the second, although there are notable ex­
ceptions to this.
The firm that appears to be the largest in Maine prefers to sell to
secondary wholesalers primarily in New York, but also in other areas.
Selling to the wholesale market frees the firm from the overhead costs
associated with the greater care required in the selective packing and
17shipping for numerous small acounts.
17. A final type of organization is those firms who are essentially 
brokers rather than dealers in lobsters. The terms "broker" and "dealer" 
are not used in a strict sense in this passage, i.e. the brokers indicated 
above may take title to the lobsters but because of inadequate storage 
facilities are forced to sell before the merchandise is delivered.
In the smaller firms the operations are not so diverse, and they 
consist mainly of buying as cheaply as possible, storing to the extent 
physically and financially possible and selling to the wholesale trade 
and to other large dealers.
As is true in many industries, small dealers are able to survive
18profitably on the basis of product differentiation.
18. See note above.
The basis for this qualitative difference is very real. Lobsters like 
all other animals vary greatly in appearance, meat content, degree of hardi­
ness, etc. (appearance includes coloration, activity, and also defects, i.e. 
one claw, feeler torn off, etc.). Unfortunately a significant portion of the 
Maine catch that is shipped out is qualitatively defective. The reason for
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this is that the New York market will absorb all kinds of lobsters at a
price, and too many Maine dealers are compelled to ship whatever they
have on hand. The pressure to ship is two-fold. First of all, to establish
storage room for new shipments they will receive, and secondly, to obtain
the cash to pay for the next load. If anywhere from 10 to 30 per cent of
the Maine catch were held off the live market, i.e. processed for meat,
19because of its poor quality, the entire fishery would benefit.
19. The lobstermen tend to be careless with the catch. If there were a 
premium on quality, then it is likely that there would be many fewer lob­
sters maimed in handling. Dealers normally buy a straight run, i.e. pay­
ing the same price (except for shedders) for all the lobsters a fisherman 
has regardless of quality.
The small dealers' problems also stem in part from their lack of
business experience. Many have come from the ranks of the fishermen and
so have little general business experience to guide them in record and
bookkeeping, the location of sources of capital, and other elementary
business knowledge and skills. Their lack of business know-how and of
conditions within the metropolitan markets is also a severe handicap
when dealing with the large wholesale markets.
We suggested above a three-fold classification for the Maine dealers.
As noted, income tax data were not available for the largest size category,
Group A. However, revenue and expense information was supplied for Groups 
20B and C.
20. For Group B a list of twenty-eight firms was submitted to the Bureau. 
From this list it was possible to select returns of four incorporated firms 
(Form 1120) and five individuals (Form 1040). The data for these two sub­
groups are given in Table III.
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Table III indicates within the limits of the sample size, using median
aggregate revenue, that the incorporated dealers are almost three times
larger than the unincorporated and also that both elements in the B group
• ? 1are larger than those in C.
21. Beyond gross sales or receipts, the figures do not appear particularly 
revealing, i.e. profit rates as indicated do not seem to reflect the true 
economic profitability of the larger incorporated dealerships.
The ratio of debt to total assets for the incorporated dealers is high 
but probably not unduly so for this type of business. The low ratio of 
fixed to total assets is consistent with what is known about the inventory 
and speculative nature of the business. However, in these relatively small 
businesses the intermingling of salaries and profits and the lack of detailed 
knowledge of how specific accounts are handled precludes any precise analysis. 
The utility of the data, therefore, is unfortunately limited to seeing if the 
indication of the relative sizes of the different dealer groupings is in 
agreement with what has been asserted about different dealer operations.
DEALER ORGANIZATION
The lobster dealer is faced with a high degree of price variability and 
a consistent threat of easy entry. Yet, in spite of this instability and 
competitive pressure, many of the lobster dealers are in close contact with 
one another. In part this contact performs a necessary and valuable function—  
it makes the market. Price information from New York and Boston is passed 
along the coast from dealer to dealer. Based on what is learned in those 
ubiquitous phone calls, supplies of lobsters are located, traded between 
dealers, and shipped to the wholesale markets. However, these ties between 
the dealers have been articulated into formal and informal organizations
on more than one occasion.
TABLE I I I
REVENUES AND EXPENSES 
Maine Lobster Dealers 1956 
Group B
Individual (Form 101+0 ) (Sample s iz e  5 )
Mean Median Range
(2 ) T o ta l  r e c e ip ts $81,900 489,500 $  7, 900- 11+7,300
(3 ) Gross p r o f i t 10,100 8,100 5, 800-  16,200
(1+) T o ta l  other
business expenses
2 , 1+00 2,200 0- 5,700
(5 ) Net p r o fi t 3,700 3,900 2 , 200-  5,000
Return on r e c e ip ts l+.5 % 28.1+ -  3 .1+ -
Incorporated ( Form 1120) (Sample s iz e  1+)
Mean Median Range
(6 ) Gross s a le s  £257,100 4257,500 4178, 300- 335,000
(7 ) Gross p r o f i t 1+8,200 50,500 35,000- 56,700
*
(8 ) Net Income or loss 2 , 1+00 3,300 3,1+00- 6,600
(9 ) B ld g s .  & other fixed  
depreciable assets
21,500 23,600 l!+,700- 2i+,300
( 10) T o ta l  assets 80,000 62,300 56, 200- 139, 1+00
(11 ) Bonds & notes  
payable
11,900 8,200 0- 31,200
( 12) Accounts payable 5,200 i+,100 500- 12,300
TOTAL DEBT 17,100 12,200 500- 1+3,500
Return on s a l e 6 0 . 9 % 1 . 3* 2.0%
Return on assets 3 . 0 * 5.2% U.7%
Debts t o  a s s e ts 21. 1+% 19 . 7% 0.9  %- 31. 2%
T  t i o  ' o f  fixed  to 27 %
COC*\ 26 %- 17 %
t o t a l  assets
REVENUES AND EXPENSES
Maine Lobster Dealers 1956 
Group C
Individual (Form lOl^Q) (Sample size  16)
Mean Median Range
(2 ) Total  receipts  $79,700 v73,100 ( 7, 800- 167,500
( 3 ) G t o b b  p r o f i t  11,200 9,100 2, 900-  39,900
(1|) Total  other lj.,200 
business expenses
1,500 0-  37,100
(5 ) Ret p r o fi t  3,700 3,700 3,200- 13,300
Return on re c e ip ts  i|..6^ 5*o A> 8 . 07^
FOOTNOTES
1 . See t e x t  for method of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
2 . Line 1 Schedule 1 ( Form lOl+O)
3 * Line 10 Schedule 1 (Form IOI4.O)
14.. Line 21 Schedule 1 (Form IOI4.O)
5 . Line 23 Schedule 1 (Form 10i|.0 ) (also l i n e  8, p. 1)
6. Line 1, p# 2 (Form 1120)
7 . Line 3 , P* 2 (Form 1120)
8. Line 1*1 , p, 3 (Pom 1120)
9 . Line 8, p. i* (Perm 1120)
10 . Line 13, P* Ij- (Form 1120)
11 . Line 16,  p. I4. (Form 1120)
12 . Line li+, p. 1* (Form 1120)
Source J Bureau of Internal Revenue# Augusta
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In 1951 a formal trade association was formed to promote the sale 
and distribution of lobsters.
The North Atlantic Lobster Institute is a non-profit 
corporation comprised of lobster dealers from Canada,
Maine, and Massachusetts, who in the aggregate handle an 
estimated 75% of all true lobsters distributed in the 
United States. Its purpose is to promote, foster, and 
encourage the marketing and consumption of North Atlantic 
lobsters and lobster products. To this end, the North 
Atlantic Lobster Institute, its members, and affiliates 
are making every effort to provide the restaurant, hotel 
and club operators, the retailer, and the general public 
with full information upon the scope and variety of uses 
to which North Atlantic lobsters can be put. At the 
same time, the North Atlantic Lobster Institute is en­
gaged in studies to improve the methods of catching lob­
sters, storing, preserving, packaging, and distributing 
them with a view toward bringing the benefits of lobster 
consumption to a constantly increasing number of American 
consumers. We feel confident that your interests will best 
be served by patronizing these forward-looking progressive 
lobster dealers.22
22. North Atlantic Lobster Institute, Directory of Members and Associates 
(Portland: 1952), p. 2 as quoted in Robert D. Witherill Marketing Maine
Lobsters (M.A. thesis, University of Maine, 1953), p. 77.
The Institute attempted to improve packaging, to assist members in
obtaining good accounts and to carry on promotional activities in various
cities using diverse advertising media. The Institute further published
a "lobster bulletin," in which it reported its activities and other items
23of interest to the trade.
23. One of the Institute's more advanced plans was the marketing of boiled 
lobster.
The association was run by a Portland advertising agency and this caused 
a certain amount of friction with some dealers who refused to join. Apparent­
ly the service provided was not useful enough to the dealers, and it was
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discontinued in 1955. There was some carry over, however, between the 
activities of the Institute and the legal troubles of the industry in 1957.
In 1955 and 1956 the Maine Lobstermen's Association had been making 
some headway in organizing the fishery. The Association's progress was 
aided by the condition of the relationship between the dealers and the 
fishermen which has always been somewhat antagonistic.^
24. There are, of course, notable exceptions to this.
These relationships have been in part paternalistic. In these cases, 
the dealer often supplied capital and equipment in return for monopoly buying
power. There was growing dissatisfaction along the coast with this type of
_  25obligation.
25. In its extreme form in some areas quite analogous to sharecropping.
In addition, the dealers and the men are separated by personal social barriers 
and the dealers' feeling of occupational superiority.
Faced by the threat of organization with its possible impact on supply 
and price, the dealers in 1957 requested the government to investigate 
whether or not the fishermen's organization was violating the anti-trust 
statute.^
26. Statement by Mr. Philip Willard in court.
The government complied but also indicted the dealers on similar charges. 
Four corporations and three individuals were charged with the following 
conspiracy:
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Beginning in or about July 1957 and continuing thereafter 
to the date of the return of this indictment, the defendents, 
the co-conspirators, and other persons to the Grand Jury un­
known, have engaged in a combination and conspiracy to fix, 
stabilize, and maintain a maximum price to be paid by them 
for live Maine lobsters, in unreasonable restraint of the 
aforesaid interstate trade and commerce in live Maine lob­
sters, in violation of Section 1 of the Act of Congress of 
July 2, 1890, . . . commonly known as the Sherman Act.^7
27. United States of America v. Maine Lobster Co., Inc., Samuel L. Arm­
strong, E.C. Palmer, Inc., Benson Lobster Co., The Willard-Daggett Co., 
John E. Willard, Jr., Charles E. Olsen (1957), Criminal Action No. 57-36, 
p. 4.
The following verdicts were returned:
Defendant
Maine Lobster Co., Inc.
Samuel L. Armstrong 
E.C. Palmer, Inc.
Benson Lobster Co.
The Willard-Daggett Co.
John E. Willard, Jr.
Charles E. Olsen
Plea
5/9/58 - not guilty 
8/5/58 - change of 
plea to nolo conten­
dere
5/9/58 - nolo conten­
dere
5/9/58 - nolo conten­
dere
5/9/58 - not guilty 
8/5/58 - change of 
plea to nolo conten­
dere
5/9/58 - not guilty 
8/5/58 - change of 
plea to nolo conten­
dere
5/9/58 - not guilty 
8/5/58 - change of 
plea to nolo conten­
dere
5/9/58 - not guilty 
8/5/58 - plea with­
drawn
Fine Imposed or 
Other Disposition
Adjudged guilty 8/5/58; 
fine, $500
Adjudged guilty 5/9/58; 
fine, $500
Adjudged guilty 5/9/58; 
fine, $750
Adjudged guilty 8/5/58; 
fine, $500
Adjudged guilty 8/5/58; 
fine, $1,000
Adjudged guilty 8/5/58; 
fine, $250
Dismissed on motion of 
the Government 8/5/58
At no time that we can discover have the Maine dealers been organized 
to fix prices in the wholesale market. This conspiracy was against the 
lobstermen. The antagonism between the men and the dealers in this dual 
conspiracy is well established in the record of the trial. Pressure was
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put on the lobstermen in a variety of ways. One device was refusal to buy 
except from those men who they traditionally bought from, i.e. there could 
be no shopping around.
Well, that was a different situation, and I went over there 
and asked him if he could buy my lobsters last summer, and he 
said no; he said, "I don't dare to buy your lobsters." And I 
said, "Why don't you dare to buy my lobsters," and he said,
"Because they won't let me." He said, "If I buy your lobsters,
Mr. Burgess, all of my customers right now will be cut right 
off from their bait supply." And that's what he told me. ®
28. United States of America v. Maine Lobstermen's Association and Leslie
Dyer (1958), Criminal Action No. 57-35, Vol. V., p. 714.
Even more important was the question of the bait supply:
Q: Now, during the year 1957, were you not in attendance
at meetings where the members were telling about the fact 
that they were unable to buy bait unless they bought it 
from the dealers and then were forced to sell their lobsters 
to the dealers in order to get the bait?
***
A: Yes.
* **
Q: And isn't it a fact, Mr. Cushing, that some of the
members up and down the coast were complaining at these 
various meetings because the dealers were financing their 
boat and equipment, that they had to do what the dealers 
insisted they do because they were in hock to the dealer?
k  k  k
A: That is correct.
★ * *
Q: And isn't it a fact because of the bait situation as
well as the fact that some of the fishermen felt as though 
they were under the thumbs of the dealers, that they were 
suggesting that they be helped?
k  k  k
A: That is correct.
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* * *
Q: Isn't it also a fact that at these meetings, the fisher­
men were complaining that the dealers who owned islands were 
insisting that they pay 3C a pound for all lobsters caught 
around the islands and that was one of the reasons that they 
wanted to tie up, to avoid paying this tribute?
* **
A: That is correct.™
29. United States of America v. Maine Lobstermen's Association and Leslie 
Dyer (1958), Criminal Action No. 57-35, Vol. VIII, pp. 1118-1125.
Dealer concern with the threat posed by effective organization of
the fishermen centers in several areas. Each dealer is particularly anxious
3 fiabout his own supply.
30. See the reference in the testimony above to the islands that are owned 
and the "leasing" of the fishing rights in adjacent waters. This extra 
legal practice insures certain dealers of a supply of cheap lobsters. See 
the Portland Press Herald (May 23, 1954) for an article on the valuation 
of such an island when the United States Navy attempted to purchase it.
He must have merchandise to sell, and since in fishing many factors may 
affect the catch, the dealers see certain advantages in strong ties with the 
men. At the same time, however, the lower the price in the summer, the 
greater is the potential profitability of their storage capacity. Finally 
an effective organization of fishermen that had competent management and 
adequate storage capacity could perform the dealer's functions at least 
to the point of selling in the New York market.
Today the fishermen's organization is negligible and yet prices are 
high enough to keep the men reasonably well off. However, this conflict 
between the men and the dealers is, given current attitudes on both sides, 
endemic and apt to be renewed whenever adverse conditions arise.
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A final aspect of Maine dealer operations is in the processing of lob­
sters. Almost all dealers are forced to process (boil) some meat but most 
do it as a last resort and then sell the meat on the local market for what 
it will bring.
A number of firms are, however, engaged in the manufacture of lobster 
products.
31. Whole frozen lobster, frozen lobster tail, lobster paste, lobster stew, 
lobster newburgh, lobster t.v. dinner, etc.
To date these activities have been carried out by relatively small 
packers and canners, who operate during the summer when prices are low. 
However, more recently one of the largest dealers has actively entered 
this field. In addition, the improvement of techniques of freezing and 
packing will permit much better utilization of lobsters not fit for live 
shipment. This is particularly important, because if there were a good 
market for less than first-class lobsters, it could become the basis for 
qualitative improvement in what is shipped live.
THE DISTRIBUTION OP BAIT
The principal bait used in the fishery whenever it is available is 
ocean perch (redfish). Redfish was first caught in large quantities toward 
the end of the 1930's when frozen ocean perch fillets became popular. 1
1. Chart 2, "Quantitative Aspects of the Fishery" compares redfish and 
lobster landings.
Redfish apparently has biological advantages as lobster bait although 
herring is still used, especially in the eastern areas.
2. In experiments conducted by the Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries, 
redfish was rated 25-29% more efficient as bait than herring. Dow, Trott, 
op. cit., p. 8.
There have been many attempts to manufacture artificial bait, none as 
yet successful. An effective artificial bait would be particularly welcome 
by the fishermen because of its dependability of supply and probably less 
offensive odor. Also artificial bait would reduce the danger from infection 
caused by constantly handling rotting fish. See the Maine Coast Fisherman 
Vol. 13, 10, and 11 (May and June, 1959) for a discussion of an attempt to 
manufacture artificial bait.
The supply of bait (that not caught by the fishermen for their own use) 
is a by-product of the groundfish filleting plants. The principal Portland 
bait company began as an independent company obtaining redfish waste from 
filleting plants and selling bait in Portland and down east along the coast. 
At the same time certain Portland dealers had also been carrying on a bait 
operation. However, the dealers did not like the handling of bait and they
agreed in 1957 to support a unified operation. 3
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3 . The handling of bait is extremely messy and most health laws forbid 
the presence of bait, dead fish, in the same building with fresh food.
Now these dealers in Portland send all the lobstermen selling to them 
to the bait supplier with a credit slip. Upon presentation of the slip the 
lobstermen will receive the designated amount of bait. The lobstermen are 
billed for bait costs which in turn will be charged against the next catch 
which they bring to the dealers.
In addition to supplying lobstermen in the Portland area, this bait 
concern also supplies, by truck, several buyers and dealers along the Maine 
coast. In the summertime the bait company also sells to two dry smacks 
which go down east to buy from fishermen and buyers.
There are two or three other bait suppliers who operate from Portland 
but do not sell in that particular market. The largest of these operates 
four trucks and supplies many buyers along the coast. All these firms obtain 
their redfish from the fish companies located in Portland. Recently these 
companies have been selling their redfish scraps or cuttings to the bait 
dealers for $30 a ton. When the bait dealers do not take the scrap, a fish 
meal company in Portland will buy it for $18 a ton. To some extent this 
price differential may be justified for two reasons: one, the bait dealers 
are given the first opportunity to buy the scrap, and two, the fish meal 
concern has installed the worm gear and dump box to facilitate collecting 
the scrap and is willing to empty the box of scrap, whenever full, at any 
time during the day or night.
Occasionally when redfish-cutting are in short supply, the bait suppliers 
may go to Gloucester. On the more frequent occasion when supply is tight in 
Gloucester, the bait suppliers come up to Portland. Fishing boats also bring
redfish into Rockland and some bait is available from that source.
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Since the war the cost of redfish cuttings has tripled and now is at
its high of $30 a ton. The price of salted redfish has also risen considerably
for the lobstermen. (The fish scrap is salted in order to avoid attracting
crabs to the lobster pots.)
1940 $2.00 per barrel
1945 $4.00 per barrel
1950 $6.00 per barrel
1955 $7.00 per barrel
1959 $9.00 per barrel
It should be emphasized that the lobster fishery is heavily dependent 
on the landing and processing of groundfish, and many times local shortages 
of bait have restricted lobster production.
THE WHOLESALE MARKETS
Once a Maine dealer has purchased lobsters, his disposition of them is 
essentially in one of two kinds of markets. The first is the fish market in 
either New York or Boston; the second, a direct market, consists of food 
wholesalers, restaurants, hotels, chain stores, and other users throughout 
the lobster consuming area of the country. While some dealers operate in 
only one of these two kinds of markets, most dealers are apt to be concerned 
with both, though in widely varying proportions.1
1. Aside from the sale of lobsters through these means, it should be noted 
that there is a more or less continuous trade among the dealers themselves. 
Some dealers estimate, for instance, that they buy almost one third of their 
lobsters from other dealers. There is also considerable direct retail trade 
in Maine in the summer.
Though it is impossible to get any precise breakdown of the final
market distributions of Maine lobsters, it is clear that the New York
market absorbs a very large portion of Maine as well as Canadian lobsters.
The annual amount of lobsters sold through the Fulton Market is about ten
million pounds. The Fulton Market handles primarily Maine and Canadian
lobsters, as Massachusetts landings of lobsters are largely absorbed in
2the local and Boston markets.
2. See Table II, "The Marketing of Lobsters."
With Maine landings and Canadian imports, each amounting to about twenty-two
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million pounds annually, the sales in the Fulton Market itself account for 
about twenty-three per cent of the total supply.
The New York lobster market may be roughly broken into two parts - the 
Fulton Fish Market wholesalers and the uptown brokers (14th Street). The 
latter are brokers in the sense that they rarely see or handle the merchandise 
themselves. They purchase lobsters from dealers along the coast who ship by 
truck to New York. Shipments are delivered to the customers of the broker 
from the freight station of the trucking firm.
Within the Fulton Market, the wholesalers have facilities for handling 
and storing lobsters and they usually deal in other species of fish. (The 
uptown brokers are apt to deal exclusively in lobsters.) Though there are 
advantages for the general fish dealer in the Fulton Market, the cost of 
doing business there is considerable, perhaps adding more than five cents 
a pound to the cost of lobsters.
The cost disadvantage is partially offset by the ability to display 
and inspect some species of fish. However, this is not an important feature 
insofar as lobsters are concerned, because usually the size of the order and 
the pressure of time do not permit opening and inspecting of crates. Lobsters 
usually arrive at the market in twenty-five pound crates and these are only 
opened to accommodate purchases of less then twenty-five pounds. Such pur­
chases constitute a very slight portion of the total market.
Generally, the common carriers arrive in the market between 5 and 6 in 
the morning. By 8 or 9 o'clock, the merchandise has been moved out. Although 
the time span between delivery and sale is short, the Fulton Market whole­
salers become involved with more handling than do the uptown brokers. This 
is true even though, as noted above, crates are seldom opened.
Though there are probably fifty wholesalers and brokers in the New York
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market, less than ten of them account for ninety per cent of the lobsters 
coming into the city, and three of the uptown brokers account for about half 
of the trade. It is estimated that the largest firm may account for thirty 
per cent of the market.
Almost all, about ninety per cent, of the lobsters sold in the New York 
market are finally consumed in the New York metropolitan area.
Aside from disposing of a great volume of lobsters, the New York market
also serves a number of other important functions. Obviously, it is to a
3considerable extent the price setter for the industry.
3. See the appendix, "The Distribution of Bait" for a more complete analysis 
of the way in which price is determined.
Though there may be a number of different prices at any one time in other 
markets throughout the industry, the price in New York is the dominant one 
to which all other lobster prices must eventually be related.
In periods of general tight supply, the price of lobsters in the,New York 
market is apt to be higher than elsewhere. This is because a fairly large 
portion of the New York market represents sales to customers whose demand 
is quite inelastic, i.e. they must have the lobsters regardless of price.
This share of the total market must, therefore, be satisfied and dealers 
will attract by a higher price such supplies as they require for this purpose.
On the other hand, in periods of abundant supply, the New York market 
is apt to become an outlet for surplus lobsters from other channels of distri­
bution. Because of its size, many contacts and potential customers, the New 
York market can absorb almost any amount of lobsters, although at reduced 
prices; i.e. demand becomes elastic at lower prices. On such occasions,
when disposing of surplus lobsters, the New York price will be somewhat lower
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than that prevailing in some of the more isolated and stabilized markets.
It should also be pointed out that even within the New York market, 
there are price differences at any one time which result from such degree 
of product differentiation as is possible. Dealers selling to New York who 
are known to sell a good product are able to obtain a slightly higher price 
than other dealers who are careless or negligent in the packing, handling, 
and shipping of lobsters.
A relatively new and important factor contributing to a high elasticity 
of demand at lower prices is the chain store. When lobsters are in the fifty 
to sixty cent range, chain stores become interested in them as a product to 
feature in order to draw customers to their stores even though they may sell 
the lobsters at cost, or even less. The potential magnitude of this market 
is indicated by the ability of one large supermarket chain to sell over 100,000 
pounds of lobsters in a week.
While the supermarkets and chain stores only become interested at the 
lower prices, the impact of their demand is such that it stabilizes the price 
in the market at a high level. Whereas the price in a buyer's market ten 
years ago might have been brought down to a twenty to thirty cent level, it 
now usually tends to be stabilized at a level of fifty cents or more.
Not only does the New York market absorb any surplus production, but 
it also regularly serves as the "dumping" ground for all "distressed merchan­
dise." This includes all those lobsters which, while once in good condition, 
have deteriorated or have been damaged and can only be sold in a large market 
with a variety at outlets. In addition, there is a considerable volume of 
lobsters sold in which the nature of the "distress" is entirely the financial 
condition of the dealer who is under pressure for cash and must dispose of
his lobsters regardless of storage facilities or the condition of the market
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On a long term basis, the continued growth of the New York market as 
far as lobsters is concerned is doubtful. The development of the brokers 
in New York operating outside of the Fulton Market has already placed dealers 
in the Fulton Market at a competitive disadvantage, especially since there is 
little that the Fulton dealers offer in the way of physical processing, in­
spection, display, or other handling of the shipments.
The primary cause of any future decline in the relative importance of 
the New York market will be due to the increased development of direct ties 
between the lobster dealer and wholesalers or customers inland.
Of course, some of the oldest dealers in the industry established 
their businesses by direct selling to restaurants, hotels, and clubs and 
have maintained this practice ever since. To carry on such a "customer" 
trade as this requires assurance of an adequate supply of lobsters the year
around, and this necessitates storage capacity as well as additional capital 
4resources.
4. Specialty sales to individual customers is profitable as one flourishing 
mail order shipping organization in Maine will attest.
Sales to these customers also involves extending a considerable amount of 
credit to buyers and the carrying of a large amount of receivables. Further­
more, to handle these accounts means a great deal of paper work, more direct 
contact with and servicing of the customers and a great deal more than the 
usual amount of care and responsibility for the quality and dependability 
of shipments. It is quite clear that a number of dealers are either unable 
or unwilling to provide this "servicing" of customer accounts.
On the other hand, once such a clientele is established, the dealer 
enjoys a great deal more stability in his price and sales. A dealer who
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sells primarily to the customer trade will try to satisfy most of his 
demand in the winter months from his own pound holdings which he purchased 
at the peak production period the previous summer and fall.
One of the recent developments that is leading to a greater emphasis 
on direct sales between the lobster dealers and the food wholesalers and 
users inland is that of the "fresh water setup." These are tanks using 
circulating artificial salt water in which lobsters can be kept alive 
for a considerable period. (Except for the use of artificial salt water, 
these tanks are essentially the same as those used for storage in Maine.)
Such tank setups are of two types - wholesale setups which may hold well 
over 20,000 pounds of lobsters and cost upwards of $50,000 and smaller 
retail tanks designed for restaurants, hotels, and other final users.
The chief advantage in the wholesale tank setups is that relatively 
large shipments by truck can be made to these points without having to 
time arrival for immediate consumption. However, great care must be 
exercised to ensure the survival of the lobsters in the tanks. In the 
first place, vigorous and healthy lobsters must be shipped. Equally vital 
are the construction of the tanks, the salinity, oxygen content and temperature 
of the water, as well as the danger of overcrowding the tank. Nonetheless, 
with proper care and equipment, a high percentage of lobsters will survive.
While many of the present wholesale tank setups are in the northeast 
where they are easily supplied by truck, one is currently being operated in 
Florida and is supplied by air freight from Boston. The limiting factor in 
geographical expansion would then appear to be the durability of lobsters 
for shipment together with the cost factor of the shipment itself.
The interest in such setups is increasing both from dealers and inland
buyers. The dealer views this market as a means of stabilizing the market
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as well as expanding the demand for lobsters. Maine dealers that have 
already either built their own tank setups or sold to them have been impressed 
by the extent to which demand for lobsters holds up in the winter season, thus 
helping to even out the seasonal fluctuation in sales. Less variability 
in sales creates greater price stability than is currently the case in the 
New York market.
One of the most successful inland wholesale setups is in Springfield, 
Massachusetts. This is a wholesale outlet, but it also attracts and sells 
to retail customers who are intrigued by the live lobsters in the water and 
other promotional devices. Not only has this therefore developed a larger 
home consumption of lobsters, but it has also generated added demand for 
lobsters in the hotel and restaurant trade.
It has been asserted that a market such as Cleveland, which is currently 
using about a half million pounds of lobster annually, could easily be doubled 
through the utilization of tanks and proper sales promotion. It will not 
take many increases of the magnitude suggested as possible in the Cleveland 
area to effect a major change in the fishery. If twenty major urban areas 
increased their consumption by only half the amount suggested for Cleveland, 
five million pounds (roughly ten per cent of the United States catch plus 
Canadian imports) would be withdrawn from the New York and Boston wholesale 
markets with beneficial price effects.
The development of these pools or tanks in inland centers puts new 
demands on the dealers which tend to contribute to certain changes and trends 
that appear to be evident in the fishery.
Whether the dealer directly enters the pool business or merely supplies 
them, he must in any case be able to provide lobsters as needed. This puts
increased emphasis on the dependability of the lobster supply. To ensure
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a dependable supply requires both closer relations with Canadian lobstermen 
and additional storage capacity, especially pounds, and to fulfill these re­
quirements, additional capital resources are needed.
The lack of capital has been a limiting factor for some dealers who 
would like to seize the opportunity for expansion forward with tank setups 
and backward with additional storage and supply arrangements. Even if the 
dealer does not own and operate the inland pools, he must give credit to 
the tank operator. This, of course, is quite different from selling for 
cash in the New York market. In effect, he must expand the credit he extends 
at both ends of his operation, i.e. to the lobstermen and to his customer.
An additional item of expense that occurs with this type of operation 
is advertising and promotion. Some of it is necessarily involved in the 
establishment of any new inland tank installation. Much more of this will 
have to be done as new market areas are invaded where lobster eating at 
home or in a restaurant has not been frequent.
To accomplish these ends, the industry will have to develop new sources
of money capital. Banks and other lending agencies must become familiar
enough with the fishery and the tank program to be willing to advance funds
5both for working capital and new installations.
5. This report is being prepared just at the time tanks are coming into 
widespread use. If the potential demand for lobster is as large as the pro­
ponents of the tanks suggest, the fishery is on the verge of a major upheaval. 
For example, at present there is a tank setup under construction in Phoenix, 
Arizona, an area never before serviced with fresh fish. Lobsters will be 
flown to the Phoenix tank at a cost of about twenty-five cents per pound.
(If return air cargoes were available from Phoenix, then the cost of shipping 
by air would be greatly reduced.) If this proves profitable, it is planned 
to install tanks in freight cars using the cars as storage and also for 
shuttle transportation of lobsters between Phoenix and major west coast 
cities. These are the tentative plans of a New York dealer.
If, in time, markets such as the west coast, middle west, and southwest 
can be profitably served on a larger scale, the crucial question will become
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the availability of supply. On this basis, one may expect moves toward 
backward integration by the large distributor in order to insure supply.
This may take many forms, i.e. direct contracts with fishermen or fishery 
cooperatives, etc. In any event, current marketing arrangements would be 
bypassed.
The use of air transport is, under certain circumstances, less costly 
than one might suppose. At the present time increasing numbers of Newfound­
land lobsters are being flown to New York. These lobsters are loaded to 
take the place of the weight of gasoline used up on the flights from Europe 
and so they move at quite reasonable rates. These lobsters are shipped dry 
in cardboard containers.
PRODUCT COMPETITION IN THE WHOLESALE MARKETS
Maine lobsters face competition from two directions. On the one hand, 
Canada produces and ships live lobsters into the United States market. Except 
for a small qualitative advantage, in favor of Canada, Canadian lobsters are 
identical with Maine's, Homarus americanus/
6. In addition to Maine, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware all produce lobsters. 
Since 1947 Maine lobsters have averaged seventy-eight per cent of the total 
United States production. (Massachusetts is the second largest producer,) 
However, in the middle 1930's, Maine production was only sixty-five per cent 
of the United States output.
A second and more recent source of 
cessed lobster products. The most
7lobster tail" from South Africa.
competition has been from so-called pro- 
important of these to date has been "frozen
7. Products that are not biologically lobsters but species of crayfish.
Canadian imports of live lobsters first assumed importance at the turn 
of the century. Prior to that time, the bulk of the Canadian catch was canned. 
But with the stabilization of that phase of the industry, attention was shifted
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to the exportation of live lobsters which offered the best opportunity for 
the expansion of income and employment for the Canadian fishermen.
OThe Canadian Lobster Commission of 1898 reported the following:
At first this trade was mainly confined to western 
Nova Scotia, Shelburne, Yarmouth, and Digby counties, 
but within the last five years it has expanded rapidly 
eastward as far as Canso, where a large export trade 
has been done, and more recently it has been extended 
to Louisburg and even as far as Port Morien in Cape 
Breton.
8. Report of the Canadian Lobster Commission 1898, Supplement No. 1 to 
the Thirty-First Annual Report of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, 
62 Victoria, Sessional Papers, No. 11c, A189 (Ottowa: April 25, 1899), 
p. 9, 10.
The Commission at the time was concerned that the lobster fishery, 
as it became more deeply involved in the live lobster trade, would tend to 
market lobster from all parts of the coast at the same time and glut the 
market. To avoid this the Commission established five seasons, a series 
covering to some extent successive periods of time along different parts 
of the coast.
At the same time the Commission was very interested in establishing 
a market for lobsters in Europe. In addition, the Commission was of the 
opinion that the U.S. lobster fishery was exhausted and was hopeful that 
what were formerly Maine markets would open to Canadian lobsters. These 
questions were of considerable importance since at the turn of the century
9the Canadian fishery was employing from 15,000 to 20,000 men.
9. Ibid, p. 12.
The ability of the Canadian lobster fishery to absorb an increased number
-11-
of fishermen is in contrast to the Maine situation where the coastal popula­
tion decline evidently could not be halted by employment in the lobster 
fishery.
In 1926 opportunities for the export of live lobsters to the United 
States were substantially improved with the introduction of shipment by 
refrigerated railroad freight cars.'*'®
The new plan proved to be so profitable and the 
business grew so rapidly that since the year 1927 the 
fishermen of the Maine coast, especially, have not 
been able to make a decent living from lobster fishing 
owing to the influx of cheap lobsters from Canada which 
have controlled the price in this country.
10. Eighth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Sea and Shore Fisheries 
State of Maine (1934), p. 5.
In recent years shipments have been made by truck especially since 
the opening of ferry service from Yarmouth, Nova Scotia to Bar Harbor, Maine.
It was in the period of depression during the thirties that Maine inter­
ests became concerned with competition from Canada. The plight of the Maine 
fisherman, who was born and reared in Maine, whose market was being inundated 
by the Canadian product, was the subject of considerable inquiry. In the 
Sea and Shore Fisheries Biennial Report for 1941 it was again commented that, 
"Canadian competition is the lobster industry's biggest problem."^
11. State of Maine Eleventh Biennial Report Department of Sea and Shore 
Fisheries (Boothbay Harbor: 1941), p. 22.
Meetings were held with Canadian officials to improve the situation. Neverthe­
less, no concrete program or recommendations were reported, and importation 
of Canadian lobsters has continued. These imports have amounted to over 20 
million pounds annually since 1948. The canned product is also imported
-12-
from Canada; over 8 million pounds (canned meat weight adjusted to live
12lobster weight equivalent) were rmported in 1957.
12. In the Eleventh Biennial Report of the Maine Department of Sea and 
Shore Fisheries, (Ibid.), it was reported that the Department had banned 
the sale of canned Canadian lobster meat in Maine due to an investigation 
which had shown that a large percentage of the meat had come from lobsters 
below the legal Maine size. The ability of Canadians to can lobsters smaller 
than the Maine legal size provides the Canadian packer with a lower cost of 
supply. This situation presents competitive difficulties for the Maine 
canner or processor since his supplies are at higher cost.
Although there is still critical comment from some of the Maine lobster
interests that the Canadian lobster imports depress their market and injure
their own incomes, the fact is that today the health of the Maine industry
is tied to continued substantial receipt of Canadian lobsters. No dealer
of any size can now operate without some reliance upon these imported lobsters.
Without this source of lobsters the expansion of markets and the use of the
new distribution methods could not be considered. To meet even present
demand would be impossible for the Maine fishery. In particular, the increased
use of the fresh water tanks and pools throughout the United States puts a
premium on an adequate and reasonably stable supply. This can only be assured
with the help of the Canadian industry. Furthermore, the staggering of closed
seasons in Canada complements the peak catch period in the summer of the Maine
fishery and thus provides a greater degree of price and supply stability to
13the market than would otherwise be the case.
13. This is not wholly true in the summer. The implication of this argument 
is that economies in marketing exist which given current institutional arrange­
ments in the fishery could not be realized without the availability of the 
Canadian supply.
-13-
There is a Canadian cooperative that acts as agent in selling many of 
the Canadian fishermen's catch. The relationship, however, of the United 
States dealer to the Canadian fisherman are not notably different from 
those prevailing in the United States. Some of the larger United States 
dealers have Canadian employees who act as agents for them in buying lobsters. 
Other dealers buy from independent buyers in Canada, giving them a commission 
as they would do in the United States. United States dealers also own and/or 
operate lobster pounds in Canada.
Consumers tend to have an image of live lobsters as being Maine lobsters, 
and to this extent all live lobsters are commonly called Maine lobsters. 
Actually, Canadian lobsters are caught when the water is colder (due to the 
closed season), their shells are somewhat harder, and they are less subject 
to mortality in shipment. Also, in an ungraded lot of them, there are apt 
to be a greater percentage of jumbos and selects than in a comparable Maine 
assortment. These factors give a slight price differential in favor of 
Canadian lobsters which may run from five to ten cents in the New York whole­
sale market. The popular conception of Maine lobsters has probably helped to 
prevent this differential from becoming any greater. Nonetheless, it indicates 
the importance to Maine dealers of exercising proper grading and sorting of 
their lobsters before shipment to the market so that their own product need 
not suffer by comparison.
Aside from the imports of live lobster from Canada, there is no other 
important producing area that ships live lobsters to the New York market.
The relatively small Massachusetts catch of 3+ million pounds annually is 
consumed in the local area. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut and 
New York have each been producing considerably less than a million pounds a 
year. New Jersey, with the use of off-shore draggers, has been producing
-14-
close to a million pounds, but all of these states together are not able 
to supply their own local markets.
Since World War II, South African rock lobster tail has become a 
competitor of considerable importance for the live Maine lobster. Though 
this product has been imported to the United States for many years, only
recently have imports of spiny or rock lobster grown to significant propor-
. . 14tions.
14. In 194Q, one observer reported that, "the spiny lobster was not important 
enough from the point of view of importation or American production to detract 
measurably from the market areas for New England's lobsters." Nevertheless, 
Ackerman commented that the five year period, 1935-1940, had seen the substi­
tution in many restaurants of South African lobster or crawfish for the Maine 
product because of its considerably lower price, sometimes only one-half as 
much as the price for Maine lobster. Ackerman's conclusion was that the "in­
ferior taste and texture will very likely discourage widespread adoption on 
the general market." (The spiny rock lobster does not have the flavor of Maine 
lobster and is also a clawless animal.)*
*Edward A. Ackerman, New England's Fishing Industry (University of Chicago: 1941), 
p. 238.
In 1960, 144,000 pounds of lobsters were imported from South Africa.
TABLE I
IMPORTS OF LOBSTERS15 
(Both Spiny and North Atlantic)
Source 1908 1900 1890
Lbs . Value Lbs. Value Value
British
Africa
136,000 $23,000 144,000 $11,000
Canada 8,064,000 1,275,000 7,329,000 915,000 $491,000
Newfound­
land & 
Labrador
5,300 1,500 17,000 3,400 76,000
All other 
sources
7,700 1,800 7,100 1,400 800
TOTAL 8,213,000 $1,401,300 7,497,100 $930,800 $567,800
-15-
15. Fisheries of the United States, 1908, Department of Commerce and 
Labor, U.S. Bureau of the Census Special Reports (Washington: 1911),
p. 62.
The improvements in freezing techniques during World War II made 
possible the rapid extension of the marketing of rock lobsters in the 
United States. (Previous to World War II much of the South African lob­
ster went to France in cans.) After the war, heavy shipment of frozen 
lobster tail was begun to the United States.
TABLE II
IMPORTS OF FROZEN LOBSTER TAIL FROM THE UNION OF
SOUTH AFRICA16
Year Pounds Value
1947 2,236,780 $1,485,076
1948 2,657,178 1,986,872
1949 2,384,847 1,873,905
1950 4,293,960 2,794,860
1951 5,443,855 3,824,835
1952 5,172,713 4,196,545
1953 5,788,847 4,865,920
1954 3,749,832 3,130,530
1955 5,582,344 4,723,661
1956 7,024,524 6,024,687
1957 6,908,185 6,446,906
1958 6,362,860 6,800,000
-16-
16. FT-110-U.S. Imports of Merchandise for Consumption, Commodity by
Country of Origin, Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce.
A few other countries also export spiny lobster to the United States 
although the Union of South Africa is by far the largest exporter.
TABLE III
IMPORTS OF FROZEN SPINY LOBSTER TAIL17 
(In thousands of pounds, six largest exporters)
Country 1955 1957
Union of South Africa 5,582 6,908
Australia 4,980 5,369
Cuba 3,463 4,249
New Zealand 3,171 4,204
Mexico 2,478 2,159
Bahamas 2,124 1,964
17. FT-110-U.S, Imports of Merchandise for Consumption, Commodity by
Country of Origin, Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce and U.S. 
Imports of Selected Fishing Products and Comparisons, United States 
Department of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Service,
In recent years, as imports have been increasing, there has been con­
cern about competition from the South African lobster. In the summer of 
1958 a bill was introduced in Congress which intended to restrict the use 
of the word "lobster" to "Homarus americanus" (which is found only in the 
Atlantic waters contiguous to the North American coast). The bill was aimed 
at curbing the sale of South A.frican lobster tail but was not enacted.
-17-
At the time it was argued before Congress by the Importers Trade 
Association that the South African product had always been advertised as
"rock lobster" and was a product completely differentiated from the Maine
n , . 18 lobster.
18. Hearings on S. 237, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
U.S. Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: 1958), p. 48.
The importing association claimed in their presentation that frozen 
spiny lobsters were not competitive with the Maine product because the 
price of spiny lobster was higher. However, it is not clear from the data 
presented that the price per ounce was higher. In fact, it appears to 
have been lower.
Though the product may be differentiated from the Maine lobster in 
the consumer's mind, the significance of such differentiation is question­
able .
The opportunity to use the word "lobster" in the promotion of the
rock lobsters has no doubt improved sales and was very helpful in first
establishing a market for the African product. However, the fact that the
South African Lobster Association is spending $800,000 a year in advertising
and promoting rock lobster is in marked contrast with the absence of any such
19program by Maine interests.
19. Ibid., p . 47.
Mr. Jackson, General Manager of the National Fisheries Institute, Inc.,
has expressed the opinion that the South African's use of the word "lobster"
could be helpful to Maine. Since this product has been advertised widely
in markets in the middle west, Mr. Jackson feels that the North Atlantic
lobster industry, "if they were inclined to do so," could now enter those
Middle West markets and take advantage of the lobster advertising of South 
20Africa.
-18-
20. Ibid.
On net balance, the importation of other species does not seem to 
have had any adverse effect on the marketing of Maine lobsters. If lobster 
dealers adopt vigorous selling policies, it seems clear that their long-run 
problem will be how to obtain enough lobsters to meet demand.
QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE FISHERY
Secular changes in output
We have discussed elsewhere the changes in output in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth centuries.'1’ As we indicated, there is no really
1. Chapters I and II.
satisfactory explanation of the decline in production from the latter years 
of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the third decade of the twen­
tieth century.
One hypothesis that has been advanced is that the fishing grounds were 
initially stocked with a dense, aged population of lobsters. The accumula­
tion of large lobsters was the basis for the fishery for a number of years.
As production increased, the density of the original population declined, and
its age and size distribution changed, until eventually a rough equilibrium
2between addition to supply and fishing withdrawals was reached.
2, The history of Canadian production is similar to that of the United States 
(Maine), See D.G. Wilder, The Lobster Fishery of the Southern Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, Fisheries Research Board of Canada, General Series Circular No. 24 
(June, 1954).
The removal of the larger lobsters probably created a greater food supply 
and reduced predation by the older on the younger lobsters, so that the equilib­
rium eventually reached was at a higher level than it would have been if there 
had not been a change in the age distribution of the population.
In the late 1920's and throughout the 1930's, the fishery suffered from
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economic depression. The depression in the Maine fishery had several
causes. Most important in the late 19201s was the increased penetration
of the American market by Canadian imports. At that time with the American
market demand for lobster relatively constant, the increased supply had
adverse price effects which hurt the American fishery. These conditions
were aggravated by the general economic depression of the 1930's. There
are indications that the price cost structure was adverse to any extension
3of fishing activity.
3. The price of gasoline and the availability of bait were two limiting 
factors. (Redfish were not available in quantity until after 1938.)
The result of these conditions was that Maine output ranged from above 
five to below eight million pounds from 1919 to 1940. Between 1940 and 
1947, output increased 138 per cent or almost twelve million pounds. Since 
1947 only once (1948) has it been below eighteen million pounds and from 
1951 through today it has been in excess of twenty million. The peak year 
was 1957 when over twenty-four million pounds were produced.
It is possible to enumerate the forces that in our opinion contributed 
to this sudden increase in production during the 1940-1947 period. However, 
for several reasons we do not feel that the data presented should be inter­
preted as more than a tentative hypothesis about the nature of the change.
Probably the major factor in expansion of output was an increase in 
the intensity of fishing. This increased intensity had a variety of causes. 
Initially, production increased in response to marked increases in price. 
This encouraged the existing group of fishermen to extend their operations 
and also attracted entry. The most obvious indication of extension of the
fishery was in the growth of the winter fishery. From 1940 to 1947 the
winter fishery increased over 200 per cent. 4
-3-
4. If 1939 is used as a base, the relative growth in the winter fishery 
is much greater. On an average basis from 1939 to the early 1950's, the 
winter fishery grew by over 600 per cent, about three times the percentage 
growth in the summer and fall fishery.
The winter and spring fishery is carried on offshore, i.e. outside
the bays, inlets, and coves along the coast, where the water is deeper and
in winter relatively warmer. Offshore winter fishing was not new in 1940,
5but as the catch data indicate, it was rapidly expanded.
5. In the 1903-1904 Bienniel Report of the Commissioner of Sea and Shore 
Fisheries (p. 33), the Commissioner reported how a price increase had 
caused an extension of the fishery into the winter months and thereby made 
possible the exploitation of new offshore, ten to fifteen miles, fishing 
grounds. He estimated that this procedure had doubled the area available 
to fishermen.
In part the rapid extension of the fishery, especially in the winter 
months, was made possible by the qualitative improvements in equipment, 
especially boats and motors, that took place over the years. Another impor­
tant factor was the decision of the O.P.A. to classify the lobster as a 
luxury item not subject to price control. Furthermore, since lobster 
fishing was food production, it was possible for the men to freely obtain 
equipment (motors) and gasoline as a contribution to defense. These circum­
stances, i.e. the control of prices except lobster prices and readily avail­
able supplies, shifted the price cost relationship heavily in favor of the 
fishermen after 1940 and made an important contribution to the stepped up 
intensity of fishing effort.
These factors, plus entry, are advanced as the primary causes of the 
increase in output. What happened was that the fishery was extended geo­
graphically, primarily offshore, and at the same time a much more intensive
-4-
inshore fishery was carried on. The work was done by more fishermen who 
were better equipped. A further assumption of this hypothesis is that 
the change in output could have occurred at any time. In other words, 
it was an economic not biological phenomenon. At whatever time the inten­
sity of the fishing was increased, the biological population was available 
to provide greater output. This assumes that there were no significant 
shifts in the lobster population, or that if there were shifts, they took 
place at a level beyond that reached by the fishing effort.
However, as noted above, this is a tentative hypothesis. Many fisher­
men feel strongly that there have been wide swings in biological abundance. 
Furthermore, Taylor and others have suggested that the secular upward move­
ment in water temperature since the middle of the nineteenth century has 
created a different marine environment in the Gulf of Maine:
Such a widespread increase in lobster landings suggests an 
environmental change making possible the survival of greater 
numbers of lobsters to catchable sizes. Tagging experiments 
in Maine and length-frequency data collected by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service over the period 1939 to 1947 indicate that 
mortality rates remained very constant over the period of in­
crease so that the increased catch was caused by an increase 
in abundance rather than by an increase in the amount of fishing.
6. Clyde C. Taylor, Henry B. Bigelow, and Herbert W. Graham, Climatic Trends 
and the Distribution of Marine Animals in New England, U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Fishery Bulletin 115, Vol. 57 
(Washington: 1957), p. 325.
The water temperature hypothesis may be important but the evidence 
presented by Taylor is anything but conclusive on this score. Another 
environmental change that may be important but which at the present level 
of biological knowledge is simply an idea is the effect of the eel grass 
disease. In the early 1930's, much of the eel grass along the coast became
-5-
diseased and subsequently died out. This grass had been one of the 
spawning areas of groundfish, especially flounders. (The disappearance
7. This was a very general phenomenon which occurred in Europe as well 
as the United States.
of the eel grass forced the flounders to seek other spawning grounds.)
Since the groundfish were predators cn small lobsters, the removal of this 
predation may have influenced the abundance of the adult lobster population. 
Additional hypotheses about the sources of biological variation in supply 
of any animal whose life cycle is as complex as a lobster's are virtually 
infinite, so that while hypotheses are plentiful, the real evidence on 
biological population variation is scarce. In this circumstance, it seems 
most reasonable to assume that the marked increase in output in the 1940's 
was due to the discovery of new populations and to the more intensive ex­
ploitation of older, already utilized, populations.
The performance of the Canadian fishery during the 1940's is not in­
consistent with this position. Canadian output increased by about five 
million pounds from 1940 to 1947, or nineteen per cent. The low level of 
this increase, i.e. Maine output increased twice as much and almost 140 
per cent, suggests that if there were a fundamental biological shift it
g
was limited to the Maine coast, and this seems unlikely.
8. On an average basis Canadian output increased roughly ten to twelve 
million pounds from the late 1930's to the early 1950's.
Since the end of the 1940's, Maine production has moved in a fairly 
narrow range, from 18.4 million pounds in 1950 to 24.4 million pounds in
-6-
1957. (From 1951 to 1958 the range is 4.4 million pounds.) The stability 
of output in recent years suggests that there is temporarily at least an 
equilibrium between fishing effort and biological abundance within those 
populations currently being exploited.
Once again we find that inadequate biological information makes 
hypothesizing about long-run future movements in output hazardous. If 
our hypothesis about the essentially economic basis for the previous ex­
pansion of the fishery is correct, then we could anticipate greater output 
in the future if economic conditions warranted it. Suppose that the current 
annual price level of about fifty cents per pound were to double in five 
years or less. Could we expect output to increase from twenty to forty 
million pounds in Maine and similarly in Canada, i.e. is it possible to in­
crease the intensity of fishing activity without rapidly diminishing returns? 
The answer to this question is indeterminate.
It is clear from population studies that there can be no increase in 
intensity in certain areas. In these areas, Sebasco for example, the catch 
consists almost exclusively of what comes into the fishery (legal size) by 
moulting. However, the yield from these areas might be increased by better 
management of fishing activity and environmental conditions. This leaves 
the question of the possibility of extension of the fishery into new and/or 
currently underexploited populations. Sharp increases in price might make 
possible and profitable offshore fishing using new techniques and equipment 
that are now too costly to employ. And price increases might also motivate 
fishermen using existing equipment to extend their operations to areas which 
are today ignored or only occasionally fished.
In any event it seems possible to expand output in the future if the
price is adequate. But there obviously is a limit to output and before any
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1929 - 1956
(thousands of pounds)
Year U.S. Landings
Canadian and 
U.S. Landings U.S, Landings and Canadian Imports (1)
U.S. Landings 
and Not Canned Canadian Iropor
1929 11,71*7 51,792 25,020 19,293
1930 13,916 57.01*4- 27,971* 22,7591931 12,1*61 58,1*26 27,979 21,291*1932 11,157 61,505 27,197 22,0331933 9,812 1*9,097 25,551 19,7181935 11.495 1*5,910 22,1*23 19,859
1937 11,576 1*6,712 21*, 720 22,2371938 11,982 1*6,306 21*,790 22,7351939 11,981* 1*6,207 26,193 23,530
19t*0 11,759 1*1,233 30,303 24,335191*2 12,299 1*2,1*61 29,1*67 21*,801
191*3 16,1*21* 1*8, U33 36,506 29,236
Ml* 17,929 53,572 1*2,536 33,109
191*5 22,727 62,237 50,717 4 2 ,4 1 2191*7 23,925 59,991* 1*6,613 42,326191*9 20,995 61,8L3 1*7,999 1*1,835
191*9 24.654 67,861* 51,1*60 1*6,017
1950 23,191* 73,334 53,278 1*5,21*0
1951 25,91*3 71*,911 55,1*95 49,5011952 25,029 72,631 56,155 1*9,226
1953 28,102 71*, 62C 55,1*56 5 0 ,7 1 3
19 5U 27,1*69 73,571 55,694 U9,936
1955 28,939 77,898 60,356 51,9011956 26,5U 78,119 57,55° 1*8,995
1957 30,152 74,771* 61,185 52,370
(1) Canned lobster converted tc live weight by multiplying by 
a factor of 1*»0.
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additional pressure is put on the lobster population, there should be a
serious attempt to learn more about the possibility of population management.
The total market supply of live lobsters is approximately the sum of
9live Canadian imports and Maine production. The total supply ran under
9. This is only an approximation because a small fraction of the Maine 
catch goes into the summer retail market. This is true of most of the 
rest of the United States catch.
twenty million pounds in the 1920's and throughout most of the 1930's. Then, 
largely under the impetus of the expansion of the Maine fishery, market supply 
rose to forty million pounds by the middle of the 1940's and it has remained 
slightly above this figure throughout the 1950's.^
10. The reader should keep in mind that the meat yield is much lower. For 
a shedder the ratio of live weight to meat may run as high as 7:1; for a 
hard-shelled lobster, 4:1.
In the 1930's Canadian imports, not canned, ran several million pounds 
higher than the amount of the Maine catch. This situation changed in the 
1940's and for the last few years, market supply has been about equally divided 
between Maine and Canada. Since 1951 Canadian imports and Maine landings have 
averaged about twenty-two million pounds each. As one might expect, the import 
figures appear to have slightly greater stability than do the Maine landings. 
This is because Canadian imports, not canned, are a little less than half the 
total Canadian landings, which allows the impact of natural fluctuations in 
landings to be adjusted.
If the price of live lobsters should rise, it would be possible for the
Canadians to shift at least part of what is currently canned to the live market
-8-
thereby increasing total supply. It also appears that, based on the size 
distribution of the Canadian catch, further extension of the Canadian 
fishery is possible, although this is by no means certain.^
11. If all northeastern United States production and Canadian imports are 
grouped together, total market supply in the 1950's runs between forty-five 
and fifty million pounds.
Long and short run price movements
Long run price movements have been plotted on both a monetary and a 
real basis, i.e. adjusted by the cost of living index. (See Chart )
The highest annual average price in the 1920's was thirty-two cents a pound 
in 1924. This was also the highest price in real terms during the decade 
(based on the scanty data that are available). However, the real price re­
corded in 1924 (forty-four cents) is considerably below what the real price 
had been in the period 1913-1916. From 1924 through the 1930's both the 
money and real prices fell more or less continually. (Actually, it appears 
that the real price of lobsters fell more or less continually from the 1913-1916 
period to 1939.) By 1939 the money price was half of what it had been in 1924, 
or sixteen cents, while the real price had declined by eighteen cents a pound 
to twenty-six cents. For the years 1932 to 1940 the average money price was 
only eighteen cents a pound.
The downward drift of prices from the early 1920's to the end of the 1930's 
is an important indicator of adverse economic pressure on the fishery. If we 
assume no changes in the productivity of the fishermen and no substantial re­
duction in the number of fishermen over this period, falling prices meant 
declining incomes. In part in the 1930's, this price effect was offset by 
the decline in the general price level, i.e. the effect on the price-cost rela­
tionship was not as severe as the price decline would indicate. However, the
-9-
offset was not complete, and therefore the lobstermen experienced almost
12twenty years of declining income.
12. The Bureau of Labor Statistics cost of living index fell by nineteen per 
cent from 1929 to 1939, while the price of lobsters declined forty-seven per 
cent in the same period. Keep in mind also that American lobster output did 
not change significantly from the 1920's to the 1930's.
This price level effect certainly helps explain the level of output 
and the general stagnation of the fishery prior to World War II.^ It
13. Agriculture also suffered from declining prices during this period, from 
the middle 1920's to the end of the 1930's.
also illustrates the dependence of the fishery on the general prosperity of 
the country, although undoubtedly better marketing techniques would have miti­
gated the downward price pressure.
The average price for the period 1941-1947 was thirty cents a pound, up 
twelve cents from the average price of the 1930's. In 1945 the average annual 
price reached a peak of forty cents a pound. At the same time, the price ad­
justed for changes in cost of living, the real price, was fifty-two cents a 
pound, an increase of twenty-six cents in six years.
Lobster prices, in money terms, have not increased with the general 
rise in prices in the post war period, and therefore, since the end of the 
war, the real price has tended to fall. The low in the real price was thirty- 
one cents in 1957. (However, 1958 saw a sharp increase.) The money price 
has remained close to post war levels, usually slightly under forty cents a 
pound.
In part the falling real price of lobsters may have been offset by in­
creased productivity, but it is clear that constant money prices and falling
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real prices have hurt the fishermen. The effect of price movements on 
the fishermen is perhaps illustrated by the following chain of events.
In 1954 and 1955 the men were increasingly restive about conditions in the 
fishery. This attitude culminated in the formation of the Maine Lobstermen's 
Association and its initial call for action against the dealers. The 
sharp rise in price in 1956 temporarily removed some of the pressure for 
action against what the men considered the primary cause of their grievances. 
When, however, 1956 was followed by a very sharp price decline, the existing 
organization was eager to take action and the result was the legal battle 
of 1957.
It should be pointed out that the dealers do not have the same stake in 
higher prices as the fishermen. The dealers' primary price concern is for 
low summer and early fall prices and for wide annual swings in price.
An index number of lobster and also other fish prices has been con­
structed to make possible more detailed examination of price movements in
14the period since 1950.
14. The monthly and annual prices used in this index are obtained by dividing 
the monthly or annual value of landings by the total number of pounds landed.
The prices are then in terms of dollars per pound. The formula used for the 
index is the regular Laspeyres formula:
x _ PiQo _ ,Pi.,PoQo,
PoQo Po PoQo
where: Pi is the price in the current period 
Po is the price in the base period 
Qo is the quantity weight in the base period 
The index of "real" prices is obtained by simply dividing the current 
price index by the U.S. Department of Commerce Wholesale Price Index, after 
putting the Wholesale Price Index on a 1950-52 = 100 basis by dividing the 
1947-49 = 100 values by the 1950-52 average of that index.
The source of the data used is the annual and monthly summary of "Maine 
Landings" published by the Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries, Augusta, Maine.
MAINE LOBSTER PRICE INDEX, U.S. WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX, 
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The striking characteristic of lobster prices is their instability.
For example, from 1957 to 1958 the average annual price increased thirty-
three points, while from 1956 to 1957 it declined twenty points. While
price variations of this magnitude do not occur all the time, they occur
often enough to suggest that market forces are the primary determinant of 
15price.
15. The amplitude of the annual swings in price is partially dependent 
on the nature of the seasonal price movements. Therefore, we will discuss 
the basis for these price movements when we analyze the seasonal pattern.
When the index number of lobster prices is compared with national 
indexes of the cost of living and wholesale prices, it appears that lobster 
prices have on four occasions (1948, 1952, 1956, and 1958) shown much greater 
increases than the national index numbers. Twice in the post war period 
(1951 and 1957) lobster prices have failed to keep up with either of the 
other two indexes. Since the early 1950's, the value of the lobster price 
index has been relatively higher than national indexes of poultry, meat, 
and fish at both the wholesale and retail levels. Also, since the early 
1950's the lobster price index has been consistently above the level of 
prices received by farmers.
It is necessary, however, to balance the general level of lobster 
prices against the uncertainty created by their instability. Price declines 
of the magnitude of 1948-49, 1952-53, and 1956-57, and the instability since 
1955 cannot help but create uncertainty and confusion in the fishery.
Seasonal variation in production and price
Seasonal variations in output are expensive in any type of enterprise. 
Marked changes in the flow of output caused overhead costs to increase
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rapidly. These increased costs take several forms, the most obvious being 
those associated with the additional money capital and equipment needed to 
handle the peak loads.^
16. For a detailed exposition of these costs in a fishery, see J.A. 
Crutchfield, "Common Property Resources and Factor Allocation," The Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science (August, 1956), pp. 294 ff.
In addition to higher costs, the concentration of output in a short
time period has, in the case of fisheries where the product is highly perish-
17able, an adverse price effect. This is clearly the case in the lobster
17. This adverse effect is felt essentially by the primary producer who must 
sell his catch at once, not by subsequent buyers in the chain of distribution.
fishery where the effect of seasonal variation on price is one of the primary 
causes of an inadequate economic performance by the fishery.
The seasonal pattern is for a very heavy concentration of the catch to 
take place in the late summer and early fall. The reasons for this are 
interrelated. When the inshore waters begin to warm in the late spring and 
early summer, the inshore lobster populations become more active and depending 
on the location along the coast and the water temperature, i.e. how regularly 
temperatures rise, they start to shed. If temperatures are high, shedding 
may be pronounced on the western end of the coast and in Casco Bay by the 
middle of June. However, in colder years the shedding may be very spotty 
and take all summer and part of the fall to cover the entire coast.
Warm temperatures also imply not only more active lobsters, but also 
better fishing weather, so that it is likely that the fishing intensity is 
greater in those years with higher average temperatures than in colder weather.
-13-
18. Water temperature also effects the growth rate of lobsters and since 
certain sizes of lobsters seem to be more catchable than others, output 
may vary for this reason.
Better weather means less set overfishing and the men may set out more 
traps, especially if there is a good June and early July. In addition, 
some entry may take place on the assumption that the good weather will 
hold all summer.
The concentration of the catch is also affected by weather conditions
which may or may not be closely connected with warm or colder water. For
example, severe storms, hurricanes in August, September, and October, may
destroy equipment and reduce the intensity of fishing activity, or an unusual
amount of local coastal fog in the summer may hamper the men. All of these
19and other forces affect the human fishing effort.
19. Obviously, another set of short run forces affect the catchability 
of lobsters, but of these only temperature is measurable.
The extreme concentration of the catch in the late summer is indicated 
in Chart 9. Two months, August and September, have accounted for from 
between thirty-four and forty-five per cent of the entire year1s catch since 
1947. The period August through October has included from forty-one to 
sixty per cent of the year's total catch with the average (median) above 
fifty-two per cent. If we extend the period to include July through October, 
we find that from fifty-four to seventy per cent, usually about two-thirds, 
of the catch is landed in these four months.
The seasonal pattern does not appear to have been shifting or changing
20over the post war period. Rather, based on the post war data, there
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20. Up until the last few years, this did not seem to be the case, i.e. 
there was a definite progression in the seasonal pattern from the late 
1940's to the 1950's with the break at 1950. This progression gave the 
impression of increasing seasonal concentration. However, since 1956 
the seasonal pattern has shifted back and forth between the two seasonal 
patterns discussed below.
appear to be two seasonal patterns in the fishery. In one, August is the 
peak month of production and in the other, September. The peak month, re­
gardless of whether it is August or September, usually accounts for about 
twenty per cent of the annual total. However, the seasonal pattern based 
on August as a peak is somewhat more concentrated than the pattern based on 
September, so that when there was a shift forward from September peaks to 
August peaks, as in the early 1950's, it appeared that the seasonal concen­
tration of the catch was increasing. From 1955 to 1958 the peak month 
shifted back and forth each year.
TABLE 2
MONTH OF GREATEST OUTPUT
Year Peak Month of Production
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
September
August
September
August
August
August
August
August
September
September
September
August-September*
*Catch was essentially 
the same both months
There is a relationship between water temperature and the timing of
peak production. The annual mean water temperature in years when the peak
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is in August is 50.3 degrees (F). In the years when the peak occurs in
21September, the annual average temperature is 48.1 degrees (F).
21. Based on the average temperature for the January-July period, August 
peak years averaged 47.5 degrees (F) while September years were 45.2 
degrees (F).
Years with the earlier peak are also associated with larger annual
landings. The average annual landings for the period 1947-1958 when
August was the peak month was 21,462,000 pounds and when September was
the peak, it was 18,952,000 pounds. However, since there is some upward
secular movement in total output and total output is influenced by a
variety of factors, the difference in total catch as associated with the
22temperature difference may not be significant.
22. For example, there were two hurricanes in 1954, the first on August 
31 (Carol) and the second on September 11 (Edna). The storms account in 
part for the sharp drop in September output in that year.
The most important effect of the difference in the two seasonal
patterns is in their price effects. When the peak in production shifts
into August, the price drops sooner and lower than when the largest output
is delayed until September. Furthermore, when the price falls early in
the season, it tends to remain low throughout the entire fall period. This
seriously affects the fisherman's income as the table illustrates.
The sharp drop in income associated with the peaking of production
in August is primarily the result of the heavy concentration of shedder
23lobsters in the catch. When the shedders come in early and in large numbers, 
the price falls due to the increase in production and also the deterioration
-16-
TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF SEASONAL VARIATION ON THE 
VALUE OF THE CATCH
Year Month of Peak 
Production
Annual Production 
(millions of pounds)
Value of Catch 
(millions of dollars)
1955 August 22.7 $8.7
1956 September 20.6 9.1
1957 August 24.4 8.9
1958 September 21.3 10.4
23. Shedders have greater catchability than hard shelled lobsters. After 
the lobster has moulted, he is hungry and more active.
in the quality of the lobsters, i.e. with shedders there are more damaged 
and weak lobsters. This qualitative decline is translated into lower prices 
in the wholesale markets and also along the coast. A substantial portion of 
the shedder catch is, of course, pounded when the price is low. But the 
withdrawal of part of the supply is not enough to prevent adverse price 
results.
Dow and others have estimated that total storage capacity in Maine is
24slightly over six million pounds. They further suggest an annual fall
24. R. Dow, D. Harriman, L. Scattergood, "The Role of Holding Pounds in the 
Maine Lobster Industry," Commercial Fisheries Review (May, 1959), p. 6.
25storage of 3,120,000 pounds.
25. Ibid., p. 9.
If we assume pounding is complete by the end of October and that only 
Maine production is pounded, then the fraction pounded out of the fall
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catch is roughly twenty-three per cent. This estimate is undoubtedly
26. Assume an annual catch of twenty-one million pounds with two-thirds 
caught in the July-October period:
.66 x 21 = 13,860,000 
3,120
13,860 = 22.5 per cent
high since part of the Canadian catch finds its way into American pounds.
This suggests that the marketing of lobsters is essentially a flow 
mechanism. The net change in the level of stocks, i.e. amount pounded, 
may be significant but only in the very short run. Whenever there is a 
significant shift in basic production, the bulk of the change is translated 
into greater (smaller) market supply. The reasons for this have been enu­
merated before, i.e. the perishable nature of the product, inadequate 
storage capacity for many dealers, insufficient working capital to finance 
inventory, the risk of mortality during storage, etc.
The August peaking of production has another influence which is not 
as clear as the price effect but which should be pointed out. Years in 
which the lobsters shed early and in large quantities tend to be associated 
with better weather and larger catches. However, the lobster year is not 
a calendar year but a moult year. In those years when the moult is early, 
the output of the fishery is high at the tine of moulting. If the good 
weather holds into the fall months, the new moult class tends to be well 
fished out by the end of the calendar year. This implies that the spring
27and early summer fishery will be smaller in the succeeding calendar year.
27. The winter fishery being primarily offshore and dealing with largely 
differentiated populations is less affected.
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The following table indicates the magnitude of this carry-over effect 
in the recent past.
TABLE 4
FLUCTUATIONS IN PRODUCTION 
ANNUAL AND MOULT YEAR RESULTS 
(millions of pounds)
Annual Data Moult Year
Year Production % Change from 
previous year
Period 
(July-June)
Production % Change from 
previous period
1954 21.7 ____ 1954-55 21.8
1955 22.7 4.6 1955-56 22.1 1.4
1956 20.6 9.4 1956-57 21.5 2.7
1957 24.4 18.4 1957-58 24.8 15.3
There is a significant reduction in the amplitude of fluctuations in output 
when measured on a moult year basis and it would therefore be worth considering 
reporting the lobster catch on both a moult and calendar year basis.
But regardless of how the catch data may be analyzed, the high concentration 
of production in the late summer/early fall remains a crucial problem in the 
fishery. The concentration of output is partly a function of the seasonal 
catchability of lobsters and the weather. However, it is clear that the welfare 
of the fishermen and in the long run, of the entire fishery, would be better 
served if production could be put on a more even flow basis. (The welfare im­
provement would be based primarily on improved quality of product and lower 
overhead costs.)
However, it is difficult to see just how this can be accomplished. Clear­
ly, there is no single cure for the summer glut. A number of partial cures 
might alleviate the situation. Perhaps the most obvious of these are some 
reasonable restrictions on entry or production or both during the peak months.
It is clear that any all out attempt to restrict production during the summer 
would meet stiff opposition from dealers and fishermen, and as the Canadian
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experience indicates, rigid closed seasons create as many problems as 
they solve.
Throughout a large part of the Maritimes the lobster fishing 
season is open for only two months of the year, whereas in 
other areas fishing is permissible for four to six months. 
Surprisingly enough, however, the most intensive fisheries 
occur in the short season areas. In such areas the fishery 
has simply adjusted to the shorter season by employing more 
men, boats, and gear in order to harvest the crop more quickly. 
It appears extremely doubtful, therefore, whether closed fish­
ing seasons have any real conservation value for lobsters.
28. Wilder, op. cit., p. 12.
Another alternative lies in the area of restricting the shedder
catch. This might take the form of a limited number of brief closed seasons,
i.e. specific areas along the coast, or of a limit on the amount of soft
29shelled lobsters that could be landed.
29. The idea of staggering closed seasons along the coast would make greater 
sense if both Canadian and American production could be coordinated by an 
international commission.
Chart 10 indicates that the operation of closed seasons in Canada have 
resulted in a seasonal pattern that is as unfortunate as the one that has 
arisen under no restrictions in the United States. The closed season has 
given the Canadian fishery the one advantage of concentrating the catch in 
the non-shedding period so that, as noted elsewhere, Canadian lobsters 
command a premium price in New York.
The Canadian seasonal pattern, like the American, also indicates the 
presence of rapidly diminishing returns for any rnoult class of lobsters.
The closed season starts with very high yields, but these quickly diminish
cfa+f fc
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in the presence of an intensive fishery. The Canadian experience also 
lends support to those who feel that given the level of fishing activity, 
the same number of lobsters will be caught out of any given moult class 
regardless of how the fishing season is arranged.
The seasonal peaking of the Canadian catch, although it comes earlier 
than Maine's, also contributes to a considerable extent to the summer glut.
This is due in part to the lag between Canadian landings and the importation 
of lobsters into the United States. United States imports in July have been 
about three million pounds and almost two million pounds in the August-September 
period.
More important, however, is the price effect that may occur in the late 
spring and early summer. The bulk of Canadian imports, sixty per cent, come
in April, May, June, and July. If these imports are coupled with heavy
Maine landings, then the seasonal price decline may start earlier than usual.
If the early drop in prices is coupled with an August peak in the Maine catch,
then a serious loss in revenue may occur in the Maine fishery.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY
This section contains our formal hypotheses about the relationships 
that exist between the forces, both biological and economic, that influence 
supply and demand in the lobster fishery. As we point out in Chapter IX, 
p. 2, to be complete, a model of the fishery must include an analysis of 
population dynamics. However, this current attempt eschews any such 
task and what we will present here merely assumes a biological supply 
condition that is adequate to cover a wide range in the level of demand.
In organizing this section we have followed the usual procedures 
employed in statistical demand analysis. These procedures, which have 
been worked out by agricultural economists in particular, theoretically 
fit all commodities equally well. However, in the lobster fishery there 
are two problems associated with the use of these techniques which have 
seriously limited the value of the statistical results obtained. This in 
no way reduces the desirability of attempting to apply the method. Further­
more, the attempt has served to organize the available data and the relevant 
variables, and preliminary models have also suggested a number of additional 
hypotheses which in our opinion should be tested in the future.
The first and most severe limitation on the use of the data is that 
there is not enough of it. For reasons which we outline below, we felt 
it necessary to limit the analysis to the post World War II period. This 
meant only eleven, or in some cases, twelve, observations. In multiple 
correlation analysis involving as many as five variables, only eleven 
observations leaves too few degrees of freedom to obtain statistically
reliable results. 1
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1. For example, the formula for correcting for the size of the sample 
of the multiple correlation coefficient "R" is:
1 - (1 - R2) (n ~ 1)n - m
when "n" is the number of observations and "m“ the number of variables.
There were several reasons why we limited our analysis to the post­
war period. The argument against extending the analysis over a longer 
time period was based on our view that the pre-war and post-war fisheries 
were essentially non-homogeneous, although the reliability of data prior 
to 1939 was also a consideration. The war period, 1940-1946, was one of 
rapid transition for the fishery. During the war a number of peculiar 
circumstances, i.e., especially price controls and rationing, made the 
fishery subject to a different set of influences than is true ordinarily.
Other data problems were inherent in the statistics. The first of 
these involved the seasonal distribution of the catch, which as we have 
noted elsewhere in this chapter, may have a marked effect on the average 
annual price, i.e. quantity may be the same but price may vary depending 
on the seasonal pattern. Water temperatures account for some of this 
fluctuation but by no means all of it. Another deficiency in the data 
is due to the non-homogeneous nature of the product at certain times of 
the year. The price of lobsters (usually the period covered is July 
through September) is a weighted average of the price of hard and soft 
shelled lobsters. The data of shedding and the proportion of soft shelled 
lobsters in the catch has an effect on annual price. (This is interrelated 
with but not exactly the same as the first deficiency noted above.) In 
fact, there are usually two demand functions facing the primary producer 
during the peak season of the catch. Unfortunately, as yet there is no
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statistical evidence of any kind on the nature of these two functions. 2
2. There is no quantitative information on the proportion of shedders 
in the catch at any given time, nor is there any evidence to indicate 
whether or not the differential in the price offered the fishermen is 
statistically relevant to the difference in bodily weight, rate of mortality, 
number of maimed lobsters, etc.
There are other deficiencies in the data. The data on mean water 
temperature on an annual basis does not reflect the timing or extent of 
the warming of the water. The same average annual mean water temperature 
may be based on quite different seasonal temperature patterns. For 
example, an exceedingly hot August and September can cancel out a very 
cold June and July. Acts of nature, such as hurricanes and storms, are 
not indicated at all in this data. And further, the data is for the sur­
face temperature at Eoothbay Harbor which differs from the bottom tempera­
tures, and from the range of bottom temperatures at different depths along 
the coast.
Finally, the series employed have exhibited similar trends (collinearity) 
during the period employed, and this effect may give results which appear 
to be significant but which are due to similar direction of movement rather 
than to meaningful relationships. (This is partially corrected by including 
time as a variable.)
Our first step was to provide a schematic representation of the demand 
and supply relationship (Chart 11). This chart indicates that biological 
supply and consumer demand are determinate of price. However, the relation­
ship between biological supply and price is seriously modified by other 
factors which regulate the intensity of fishing activity and the efficiency 
of the distribution system. A detailed list of the factors which determine 
these relationships is appended to the chart.
The initial attempt to formulate a statistical demand function for 
lobsters (Canadian) was by H. Scott Gordon. The results of his attempt 
were statistically negative, and while our results are consistent with his, 
we do not agree with the conclusion he reached; namely, that catch fluctua­
tions result primarily from fluctuations in biological populations.^
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EFFORT RETURN
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IMPLIED IN FLOW CHART
A Partial List of Influences on the Supply of 
and the Demand for Maine Lobsters
Supply
I. Biological supply
1. The state of the current population (especially age and 
size distribution)
2. Food supply
3. Predation and mortality from sources other than man at 
all stages
4. Rate of reproduction and growth 
II. Lobster catch
1. Legal size restriction
a. Effect of size limits on conservation
b. Relationship of size limits to the degree of 
catchability of various sizes of lobsters
2. Fishing environment
a. Weather conditions; number of days fishing is 
possible inshore and offshore; loss from storms
b. Water temperature; critical temperature limits; 
effect of temperature on the rate of activity 
(catchability), growth, and time of moulting
3. Fishing intensity
a. Number of fishermen
b. Amount of capital equipment employed and its rate 
of utilization
c. Adequacy of the relationship of earnings to current 
costs to provide for motivation of existing fishermen 
and an incentive for entry
d. Limiting factors; availability of bait, design of 
equipment
III. Storage and Distribution System
1. Workability of the structure of distribution
a. Number and size of dealer firms
b. Financial capabilities
c. Level of entrepreneurial skills
2. Amount and distribution of storage facilities
3. Efficiency of the marketing system
a. The scope of the distribution system
b. Sales promotion efforts
IV. Consumer Demand
1. Consumer income
2. Tastes
3. Availability of supply in specific markets
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In these three cases (Atlantic lobster, Pacific salmon, 
Pacific halibut), the statistical results appear to be clearly 
negative. No significant correlation exists between catch 
and economic factors. This is as might be expected. Atlantic 
lobster and Pacific salmon are known to be exploited very in­
tensively and one would expect that catch fluctuations would 
be dominated by changes in the magnitude of the stocks.
Pacific halibut has been under strict quota regulation and 
hence no opportunity has been allowed for landings to respond 
to economic factors during the period studied.
3. K. Scott Gordon, "Economic Factors in Catch Fluctuations" from 
Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, January, 1955, 
Volume XIII, No. 1, p. 92.
Gordon used the standard method of correlation analysis with the
following variables: annual catch; X^ consumer expenditures; X^
average annual price. His data covered the period 1926-1950, and the
variables X^  and X^ were adjusted by a consumer price index.
The variables we used in constructing the demand equation are of the
4order usually employed in this type of problem.
4. Our variables are the same as H. Scott Gordon's except that we have 
added total landings and time and on the supply side, water temperature.
The results of the simple linear (bivariate) correlations between 
the variables are given in Table 6. In all cases the unexplained variance 
is high (except where variables are correlated with time or the Maine catch 
is related to total supply).
A statistical demand function was then derived from the indicated
variables by the standard multiple correlation techniques:
Xn = 8 8 . 57X -  7 3 . 29X., + 0 . 6 7 X ,  -  6 4 5 . 38X,  -  2 6 , 8 3 8 . 3 91 2 3 4 5
where
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= Maine landings in thousands of pounds
X^ = U.S. personal consumption expenditures on goods and services 
in dollars (adjusted by Consumer Price Index, 1947-49 = 100)
X^ = Average annual price paid to lobstermen for Maine lobsters 
in cents (adjusted by Consumer Price Index, 1947-49 = 100)
X^ = Total U.S. landings of lobsters plus Canadian imports (not 
canned) in thousands of pounds
X^ = Time, measured in one year units, mid-1952 center
The standard error for each coefficient was computed and is given in
Table 7. The magnitude of these standard errors indicates that except
for X , the relationship between Maine and the combined total market
supply (i.e., United States output and live Canadian imports) that none
of the coefficients is significant. This is also reflected in the low
values in the partial correlation coefficients given in the same table.
However, the overall equation has a coefficient of correlation of
2(R. = -97 and a coefficient of determination of (R , „ 1 = .94.i.234o 1.2345
This correlation result, which is high, especially in view of the limitations 
we have discussed, is due to the close relationship between the Maine catch 
and total supply.
A more systematic review of the contribution of each variable to the
overall coefficient gives the following results:
If we start with our most significant result, the relationship between
Maine landings and total supply, our equation would be as follows:
(2) X, = 0.67X„ - 11,794.91 4
This equation has a coefficient of correlation of r = .96 and a coeffi-
2cient of determination of r , = .91 (compared with R, = .97 and14 c 1.2345
2R , = .94). Table 9 indicates the results when predicted values1.2345
based on this equation are compared with actual results. The per cent of
error in prediction is relatively low. This is because the amount of
TABLE 5
STATISTICS USED IN DETERMINATION OF DEMAND EQUATION
Year X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
1947 18,277 173.3 39.17 42,326 -5
1948 15,923 172.8 39.34 41,835 -4
1949 19,273 177.4 34.14 46,017 -3
1950 18,353 188.7 33.99 45,240 -2
1951 20,759 187.7 31.31 49,501 -1
1952 20,036 192.3 37.43 48,226 0
1953 22,300 2 01.5 32.97 50,713 1
1954 21,668 206.1 32.51 49,936 2
1955 22,718 222.2 33.51 51,901 3
1956 20,572 229.9 38.15 48,995 4
1957 24,403 233.3 30.52 52,370 5
Sources and descriptions of above statistics:
X^ = Total annual landings at Maine ports in thousands of pounds. Data from various issues of 
Maine Landings published by the Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service in 
cooperation with the Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries, Zuigusta, Maine
= Total U.S. personal consumption expenditures in dollars adjusted by the U.S. Department of 
Labor Consumer Price Index (1947-49 = 100). Data from various publications of U.S. Department 
of Commerce
X^ = Average annual price of Maine lobsters in cents adjusted by the U.S. Department of Labor Consumer 
Price Index (1947-49 = 100). Data from Maine Landings cited above. Data (unadjusted) computed 
by dividing total landed value by total landed pounds for the given year
X4 = Total U.S. catch plus Canadian imports (not canned) in thousands of pounds. Data from various 
publications of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
= Time in yearly units measured from mid-1952
TABLE 6
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION
Simple Linear Case 
n = 11
1947-1957
Coefficient 
of Correlation
Coefficient 
of Determination
1. Maine Landings .81 .66
(personal consumption adjusted)
2. Maine Landings -.73 .54
(average price adjusted)
3. Maine Landings .96 .91
(total landings)
4. Maine Landings .86 .73
(time)
5. Personal consumption adjusted -.41 .16
(average price adjusted)
6. Personal consumption adjusted .82 .68
(total landings)
7. Personal consumption adjusted .98 .96
(time)
8. Average price -.73 .54
(total landings)
9. Average price -.49 .24
(time)
10. Total landings and time .89 .80
"r" as used in the text and tables that follow is the Pearsonian coefficient 
of correlation. A pure number which expresses the relationship between two 
variables, "r" has units of - and -1
2"r " the coefficient of determination, indicates how much of t)he relationship 
is explained. If the relationship between X^ and is .9, r is then .81.
This says that 81 per cent of the variation m  X^ is explained by the presence 
of X^ and 19 per cent (100 - 81 = 19) is unexplained, i.e., due to the presence 
of some variable not identified in the problem. ^  is similar to the value
"r" except that the problem now includes three or more variables. r shows
the relationship between X^ and X^ with the variable X^ present but held constant
//l/
Table ~ j
Standard Error C o e f f ic ien t
Regression
C o ef f ic ien t
Value o f  
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bl2.3U5
88 .6 62.9
r i2 .3^5  *
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bi5.23U 61+5.U
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Table 9
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED LOBSTER CATCH
from D3'A:o equation M
Pre di c ted
Me. Lendings Landings
Year Actual X1 Error # Error
191+7 18,277 17,300 -977 -5 .3 #
191+8 15,923 16,268 +345 +2.2#
191+9 19,273 19,220 -  53 -0.3#
1950 18,353 19,065 +712 +3.9#
1951 20,759 21,389 +630 +3.0#
1952 20,036 19,389 -18 9 -0.9#
1953 22,300 22,013 -2 8 7 -1 .3 #
1951+ 21,668 21,287 -3 8 1 -ms#
1955 22,718 23,314- +596 +2.6#
1956 20,572 21,059 +487 +2.4#
1957 2l+,l+03 23,541 -862 -3 .5 #
nTable / 0
Coefficent of Coefficient of
Correlation Determine tion Variables
*1 £
m 0.95529 rf. = 0.91258 14 Me.Catch and Live Market U. S.(to tal  supply)
Ri .1+5
= 0.95531 R2 = 0.91260 1.1+5
Adding Time
Ri  .21+5
= 0,96614-9 RU s  *°-93lai Adding Consumption Expenditures
Rl. 231+5 = 0 .968 07 Rl . i ik S = °*93715 Adding Price
Partial Coefficients Related to the Above
r i5.U =
0.01183 rf_. . = 0.00011+
1 i;.
r i2.U5 =
: 0.1+8112 * 1 2 . 4 5 = 9*23140 i
*13.21+5
: 0 . 211+00
r l 3 .2 W  = °-0U58°
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Canadian live imports has been reasonably constant so that fluctuations 
in the combined total output are due primarily to fluctuations in the 
Maine catch.
If we attempt to improve on this basic relationship by adding 
economic variables, i.e. consumption and price, as Table indicates, 
we gain very little.
The failure of the addition of economic variables to add anything
significant leaves us with the same statistical result as H. Scott Gordon.
However, as we noted above, this does not rule out the possibility of an
existence of a significant relationship between economic factors and the
demand for lobsters. The presence of this type of relationship is suggested
2by the significant relationship r ^   ^= .49 between Maine production and 
price as well as the results in the simple bivariate case which suggest 
significant relationships between Maine landings and price and Maine landings 
and consumption.
It still appears likely that more data, the use of lagged relationships, 
and additional variables would make it possible to construct a significant 
demand equation.
THE SUPPLY FUNCTION
The method of construction of the supply function and its analysis 
is symmetrical with what we have presented for the demand function. The 
supply function is differentiated from the demand function in that it 
excludes X^ (personal consumption) and X^ (total catch) and it includes 
X (yearly mean water temperature). Water temperature stands not only 
for the temperature catch relationship but also for a measure, indirect 
to be sure, of the intensity of fishing effort. Temperature is a rough 
guide to intensity because higher average temperatures imply better 
weather and good fishing conditions. This assumption, however, is only 
true in the short run and temperature is an inadequate measure of the 
intensity of fishing if the level of output is changing rapidly.
The statistics used in calculating the supply equation are given 
below in Table
The simple bivariate correlations are, as indicated, not indicative
of close significant relationships between the variables. Particularly
disappointing are the coefficients of determination for the relationship
between landings and price and landings and water temperature.
Multiple correlation techniques yield the regression equation for the
supply of lobsters for the period 1947-1958:
( 3) X = - 211.66X,, + 477.66Xn + 337.84X^ + 10,977.22 1 3 5 6
The correlation coefficient derived from this equation is R. = .941.356
2and the coefficient of determination is R = .89. Unbiased estimates1.3 4 d
of the standard errors of the coefficients of regression were also computed 
and are given in Table 13.
TABLE 11
STATISTICS USED IN DETERMINATION OF SUPPLY EQUATION
Year X1 X3 X6 X5 U.S. Dept, of Labor Price Index
1947 18,277 39.17 48.5 -5 95.2
1948 15,923 39.34 46.7 -4 102.8
1949 19,273 34.14 50.1 -3 101.8
1950 13,353 33.99 49.6 -2 102.8
1951 20,759 31.31 51.5 -1 111.0
1952 20,036 37.43 50.) 0 113.5
1953 22,300 32.97 51.9 1 114.4
1954 21,668 32.51 50.2 2 114.8
1955 22,718 33.51 50.1 3 114.5
1956 20,572 38.15 48.5 4 116.2
1957 24,403 30.52 48.9 5 120.2
1958 21,312 39.68 47.3 6 123.5
Sources and descriptions of above statistics:
X = Total annual landings at Maine ports in thousands of pounds. Data from various issues of Maine
Landings published by the Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service in cooperation
with the Department of Sea and Shore Fisheries, Augusta, Maine
= Average annual price of Maine lobsters in cents adjusted by the U.S. Department of Labor Consumer 
Price Index (1947-49 = 100). Data from Maine Landings cited above. Data (unadjusted) computed 
by dividing total landed value by total landed pounds for the given year
X6 = Mean yearly water temperature (Farenheit) at Boothbay Harbor. Data supplied by Fish and Wildlife
Service. U.S. Fishery Laboratory at Boothbay Harbor
= Time in yearly units measured from mid-1952
U.S. Department of Labor Consumer Price Index (1947-49 = 100) taken from publications of the U.S.
Department of Commerce
TABLE 12
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Simple Bivariate Case 
r = 12 1947 - 1958
r r 2
Maine landings - average price (adjusted) -.61 .37
Maine landings - mean water temperature .43 .18
Maine landings - time .80 .64
Average price (adjusted) - time .19 .03
Average price i!adjusted) - mean water temperature .72 . 53
Mean water temperature - time .03 . 00
TABLE 13
Coefficient
Regression
Coefficient Value Standard Error
of
Correlation
r13.56 -211.66 124.4 -.52
r15.36 All.66 146.7 .91
r16.3 5 337.84 262.5 .41
As was true in our demand equation, only one coefficient is statistically
significant, the one which relates catch and time. If we equate all the co­
efficients in (3) to zero except that of X,_, we reduce equation (3) to the 
following:
(4) X± = 477.66X5 - 20,227.56
The coefficient of correlation for this equation, as given in the table of
2bivariates, is r,, = .80 and the coefficient of determination is r , = .64.15 15
In the supply case there is a greater gain from adding variables than
was true in the equation where almost all of the value of the correlation
coefficient was determined by one relationship. The addition of temperature
and price yields a net determination of .69 5 = -69, i.e., 69 per
cent of the unexplained variance of (100 - 64 = .36) is accounted for by
the additional variables that was not explained by the simple bivariate
relationship between catch and time.)
On a step by step basis the following results were obtained starting 2from r, _ = .80 and r , =  .64 adding price as a variable we have R, = .89 la 15 1.35
2and R  ^ ^  = .80. The further addition of water temperature gives the values 
for equation (3):
R1.356 = - 94 and R 1.356 = *89
However, as was true in the demand case the absence of statistical
significance in the regression coefficients casts serious doubts on the 
validity of the results.'"’
1. The partial coefficients of correlation, holding time constant, were also 
computed.
r r
Catch and Price ri3.5 -.79 .62
Catch and Water Temperature r 16.5 .67 .44
Catch, Price and Temperature r136.5 .83 .69
THE WATER TEMPERATURE HYPOTHESIS
We have referred on several occasions to the relationship between 
temperature and catch and we have included water temperature (near surface 
temperature at Boothbay Harbor) as a variable in our supply equation. We 
have also indicated our dissatisfaction with previous work on this hypothesis. 
This is not the place for a complete review of the issues involved in this 
suggestive relationship; however, in the course of experimenting with a 
number of temperature-catch relationships, we have found one that is both 
reasonable and statistically significant. Since this may become eventually 
an important aspect of the determination of lobster supply, we include it 
at this point.*"
1. We plan in the future to undertake a systematic review of the temperature- 
catch relationship.
The relationship which we found to be significant was between the per­
centage of the yearly catch landed in the months of March through August and 
the mean Boothbay Harbor water temperature for the year. This relationship 
is given in Chart 12.
This is essentially a relationship between the seasonal pattern and 
temperature. It is more restricted than previous hypotheses in that it 
does not assert anything directly about the level of output. This relation­
ship deals solely with the distribution of output and from this distribution 
pattern further deductions may be made about price and future output effects 
Based on all observations in the period 1939 to 1958, we find a value
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of r = .61 which is significant at a 1 per cent level. If we refine 
our data by removing the period 1939-1946, we obtain r = .74, which is 
also significant. The justification for this refinement has been offered 
before and is basically that the war and pre-war fisheries are not homo­
geneous with the post-war fishery. If we also removed 1956 from the remain-
2ing series, we find r = .86 and r = .74. 1956 is peculiar in that the
catch in October was almost as high as the September peak.
This relationship says that if temperatures are low in a given year, 
the landings will be relatively low in the six-month period from March 
through August, i.e. the remaining six months will have a higher relative 
share of the catch than they will have if temperatures are high. This 
assumes that most of each moult class will be caught, and the correlation 
results indicate that temperature dictates to some extent when it will be 
caught.
Lower water temperatures are, therefore, indirectly associated with 
higher prices and vice versa. As we noted in our discussion of the seasonal 
pattern, if the price is forced down early in the season, then it tends to 
stay depressed throughout the summer and fall. In this manner temperature 
and its concomitant side effects seem to influence the level of earnings 
in the fishery in the short run.
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE LOBSTER FISHERY
This chapter is an attempt to integrate the specific economics of 
lobstering with some recent developments in the economic theory of fisheries 
The principal theoretical papers in economics are:'*'
1. 1) H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource:
The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy (April, 1954). H. Scott Gordon, 
"The Economic Approach to the Optimum Utilization of Fishing Resources," 
Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada (September, 1953).
2) Anthony Scott, "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," 
Journal of Political Economy (April, 1955) .
3) Milner B. Schaefer, "Some Considerations of Population Dynamics 
and Economics in Relation to the Management of the Commercial Fisheries," 
Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada (September, 1957).
4) The papers in a symposium conducted by the FAO, The Economics of 
Fisheries, R. Turvey, Ed., FAO (1957).
More specifically, this chapter is a theoretical analysis of the
nature of supply in the fisheries, and also includes a discussion of the
impact of supply conditions on the welfare of the fishery. The crucial
economic and biological question is, of course, what is the optimum rate
of withdrawal of the stock of any marine species. However, it is impossible
here to discuss adequately, if we could, the complex question of biological
population dynamics. We may only suggest that knowledge in this field is
in a state of flux and that commonly accepted notions of "good conservation
2policies" are rapidly changing.
2. For example, see Lionel A. Walford, Living Resources of the Sea (New York 
Ronald Press, 1958).
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More specifically, the biological problem is how to get the optimum 
metabolic performance from a given species that includes man among its 
predators. However, this optimum is not easily defined. Is it in terms 
of a population that has an age distribution that includes many older and 
larger individuals or a population of younger more rapidly growing indi­
viduals or some other alternative? The answer to this question is as yet, 
given the complexity of marine environments, not determinable. For many 
marine species with their fantastic reproduction rates predation by man 
may play a very minor role, the size and type of population being dependent 
primarily on environmental conditions, i.e. food supply, predation in the 
larval stages, etc. For example, if the average female lobster carries in 
excess of 15,000 eggs of which only half a dozen survive to adulthood four 
or more years later, it is obvious that many more lobster dinners are enjoyed 
by other predators, including older lobsters, than by man. The case is even 
more striking for other species. The adult female codfish may lay several 
million (or more) eggs at each spawning; however, man may be the principal 
predator on the adult populations.
Finally, to be meaningful, biological population dynamics (supply) must
be considered in conjunction with the economics of the fishery. And here
one must decide on a suitable time horizon for the exploitation of a given
fish resource in a given state of technology. The aim of the fishery is
human subsistance and the improvement of economic welfare, not the preserva-
3tion of any kind of fish. Therefore, given costs and techniques of fishing
3. Popular belief persists that some "good", largely of a conservation 
nature, will accrue from the "saving" of even biologically undesirable 
members of a population; i.e. the preservation of venerable lobsters is 
"good conservation" because they are not being utilized commercially.
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suggest that the long run optimum yield may involve running down the
stock of a certain species, i.e. the fish population should be reduced
to the point of marginal return for the effort expended.
We have emphasized the complexities of the biological environment
and of the interaction of the biological and economic theory, merely to
point up the extremely tentative nature of our economic conclusions. A
great deal more must be learned about the extent and nature of the supply
of any marine resource before a useful model of maximum utilization based
4on both cost and supply considerations can be constructed.
4. This should not be taken to mean that if we had all the biological in­
formation we would wish for that the fisheries of the world could then be 
exploited rationally. Institutional barriers that vary from the habits and 
superstitions of fishermen to international agreements are also very important 
real blocks.
If we cannot, as yet, deal effectively with a general theory of a fishery, 
we can examine the state of economic theory and see what light it will shed 
on at least a partial area of the theory of fisheries.
The current status of economic thinking centers on the common property 
hypothesis. It is asserted that the exploitation of a given resource will 
yield a smaller average return to the exploiters if no one owns the resource 
than if the resource is owned as is any other piece of private property.'*
5. The technical economic argument runs as follows: In a purely competitive 
model all firms are usually assumed to have homogeneous cost curves. The long 
run equilibrium solution for the industry is when price equals average cost 
equals marginal cost for all producers.
If the assumption of homogeneous cost curves is relaxed to allow for 
(say in the case of agriculture, different productivity of different pieces 
of land) difference in the productivity of the fixed factor, then some firms 
will find themselves in a position where the going price is greater than 
their minimum average cost. The firm in this position will extend output
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to where marginal cost is equal to price and so the industry will continue 
to price on a marginal cost basis. However, because it can restrict entry, 
i.e. it owns the more productive fixed factor, the advantageously located 
firm will earn intramarginal rent to the extent that price exceeds average 
cost.
In the case of the fishery that more productive fixed factor, i.e. a 
specific fishing ground, is not owned and therefore the intramarginal rent 
it generates attracts entry. The effect of entry in the more productive 
area will be to increase costs. Costs will creep up until all producers 
in all fishing grounds are operating as marginal producers on marginal 
fishing grounds. In effect this is an actual case of homogeneous cost 
functions caused by unrestricted access to the differential rents that 
might accrue if the different areas were owned by individuals or firms.
And theoretically, since all producers are equating price, average cost 
and marginal cost, each firm is earning a normal return, i.e. a purely 
competitive case is realized.
It is not a clear "a priori" what the effect of entry will be on out­
put and therefore industry price and the long-run equilibrium solution.
In some instances, entry may cause an extension, geographically, time- 
wise, and in terras of intensity of effort and therefore increase output.
This is a partial explanation of the increase in output in the Maine lobster 
fishery from 1940 to 1947. However, in certain cases, i.e. the Sebasco 
area (see Chapter ) the population curves are so badly skewed, "J" 
shaped, that it does not appear likely output could expand without autonomous 
biological changes in supply, i.e. the catch each year consists almost ex­
clusively of the moult class that comes into the legal size range so that 
for each moult year returns literally diminish toward zero.
While the common property hypothesis may have some affect, the basic 
cause of poverty among fishermen is still to be found in low productivity 
and the impact of monopsony and oligopsony.
An underlying assumption of this analysis is that the theoretical 
comparison between returns to owned and unowned resources is carried on in 
a context of pure competition.
6. A discussion of the welfare implications of the purely competitive firm 
and industry may be found in any textbook on economic theory. An excellent 
treatment which thoroughly describes the welfare norms and structural limi­
tations of the competitive model is in Joe S. Bain, Pricing, Distribution 
and Employment, (Revised Edition; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1953).
Competitive industries usually have well documented histories of 
operational difficulties. There are a wide variety of reasons for these 
problems. Factor immobility is perhaps the most important cause of excess
-5-
capacity, with resulting low wages and inadequate return to capital, al­
though lack of financial strength, weak management, no funds for research, 
the nature of the product, the impact of oligopolistic or non-competitive 
industries on the competitive industry, etc. all contribute to a poor 
performance.
Of all possible industrial comparisons, the fisheries are most analo­
gous to agriculture. Agriculture is ordinarily classified by economists 
as an increasing cost industry, i.e. an industry where the per unit cost 
of production increases as output expands. In the usual case increasing 
cost results from the operation of variable proportions, i.e. the applica­
tion of increasing amounts of a variable factor, input (labor), against 
a fixed factor (land, capital). Returns from additional units of labor 
input will at first increase and then subsequently decline (costs will 
move inversely, first falling, then rising). This is the traditional 
Ricardian case of increasing cost (diminishing returns). There are some 
slight differences between the fisheries and the typical Ricardian case. 
Increasing costs in fisheries are partly due to diminishing returns.
(This is probably especially true of the lobster fishery with its catch 
size limit and relatively discrete populations into which a new moult 
class is projected each year.^
7. Also important is the high catchability of the post-moult lobster and 
the impact of water temperature (seasonal variations) on foraging and 
catchability.
External economies and the pattern of resource use over time are also factors 
that may cause increasing costs. However, the differences cited are relative­
ly minor and for all practical purposes the fisheries may be considered to be
the same as agriculture in their tendency for costs to rise with increased
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intensity of fishing. These industries are similar, therefore, except 
that in the case of the fisheries, the basic resource - the collection 
of banks, reefs, etc. - that make up the fishing grounds is available 
to all comers. In agriculture the productivity of different land areas 
varies considerably. Each farmer as the owner of a particular piece 
of land plants and harvests his crop. The price he receives for his 
crop is set by supply and demand conditions in the market, and is the 
same for all farmers. However, farm incomes, the return to each farmer, 
will vary based in part on the relative productivity of the various pieces 
of land cultivated. The plots of greater productivity earn what are called
g
intramarginal rents.
8. If all plots of land were the same size and had the same labor and 
capital input some would yield greater output than others.
In the fisheries these intranarginal rents tend to be eliminated even
though different fishing grounds have different productivities. Where
there is a competitive industrial structure but no one owns the resource,
each producer is free to exploit the most productive grounds. The result
is that many producers will move to exploit the most productive grounds
first. However, the returns to each producer will be reduced since too
many are attempting to use the same ground. The ultimate result of this
competitive withdrawal will be to reduce the returns to each fisherman
to that available at the margin, i.e. to the point that the return to
each fisherman on what was the most productive ground is equal to the
9return to the fisherman on the least productive ground.
9. In the lobster fishery the moso productive grounds are perhaps those 
which are the most consistently inaccessible.
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In this situation with all producers operating at the margin there are 
more fishermen (and capital) in the fishery than there would be if the 
fishery were owned. In this situation no fisherman earns any intramarginal 
rent, although the aggregate return to the fishery is approximately the 
same as if the fishing grounds had been privately owned.^
10. Based on the assumption that productivity is non-variable and cannot 
be influenced by man.
It is impossible to say "a priori" how much rent is lost by fishermen 
in this fashion, but whatever the amount, it serves to accentuate the diffi­
culties of a competitive industry operating in a world of less than perfect 
competition. It is harder than usual for individuals and firms to achieve 
the financial strength needed for stability and specialization and the ex­
ploitation of any cost advantages that might accrue to larger organizations. 
At the same time the low rate of profit makes money capital difficult to 
obtain.
However, the analysis of the elimination of rent in the fisheries needs 
some modification. There is an element of luck, of gambling, in all fishing. 
Fishermen, like prospectors, are always hoping for the "big catch." Since 
"big catches" do occur, these represent a rental income to the fortunate 
fishermen. However, the lucky catches may be distributed randomly among 
the individuals and firms in the fishery and what is more important they 
are not consistent enough to provide greater financial strength and stabil-
11. The more competent fishermen are looked upon with grudging respect by 
the less competent for their ability to make big catches with more than random 
consistency; i.e. the two hundred trap fisherman who catches as many lobsters 
as his three hundred trap competitor.
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The evaluation of the loss of rents is difficult, but in all probability
equally important is the nature of the buyer's market that any fishery
faces. Great pressures may be exerted by monopsonistic (a monopolist
who is a buyer, not a seller) and oligoponistic buyers and these market
forces may outweigh the loss of rents in any given fishery.
At this point we may ask how, in what way, does this general model
of a competitive industry without intramarginal rent fit the specifics
of the Maine lobster fishery. First of all, it does not appear that
the productivity ladder, i.e. the difference in productivity in different
fishing grounds is very great. Therefore, the intramarginal rent lost is
12an important but not a crucial factor in the welfare of this fishery.
12. Biologists have suggested that along the Maine coast from Small Point 
(the eastern edge of Casco Bay) to Cutler is roughly an equally productive 
fishing area. West of Small Point productivity drops due to increasingly 
sandy bottoms while east of Cutler lower water temperature and a less 
favorable conformation of the coast affect the catch.
Rents in the form of "lucky catches" have been seriously affected by 
the changing technology of the fishery. The increased use of the fathometer 
has enabled the fisherman to locate the hidden ledge with its dense lobster 
population. However, the fishery is so intense that new highly productive 
areas do not go unnoticed for long, and the initial advantage is soon lost. 
The impact of competition on productivity differences is less the further 
offshore the new grounds are located, so that there is probably some net 
gain to individuals from productivity differentials.
There is also considerable difference in the productivity of individual 
fishermen. Personal income is a function of hours worked, attention paid 
to gear and equipment, careful observation of ocean conditions, and the
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general level of personal organization and competence. 13
13. There is some resemblance to private property in the lobster fishery 
in the form of traditional family fishing rights. These are, of course, 
extra-legal.
The crucial condition in the determination of the lobsterman's income 
is the ease of entry in the fishery. Entry is possible for less than $100 
capital investment. This will cover the cost of a row boat, possibly in­
cluding a second hand outboard motor, a few traps, and a license. Equipment 
of this kind is sufficient for a summer fisherman who works inshore, i.e. 
in the bays and coves. Entry of this type is a significant factor in the
r- u 14fishery.
14. The phrase "equipment of this kind" is used here to cover all inshore 
summer fishermen, some of whom may use quite extensive equipment. The number 
and age of part-time fishermen is discussed in Chapter III.
Since there are apparently no great economies of scale in the fishery,
entry is profitable for part-time fishermen. Perhaps the greatest damage
of the ease of entry is in terms of its seasonal concentration. The summer
peak of production is certainly the greatest problem facing the producers.
Easy entry contributes to this summer glut and accentuates the price decline
in the July-September period with an adverse effect on annual earnings of
the fishermen as contrasted with summer monthly earnings. This latter
point, of course, prevents effective collective action by the fishermen.
The Maine Lobsterman’s Association had great difficulty in "tying up" the
coast in the summer of 1957 at the time fishermen were making their highest
monthly gross earnings of the year. 15
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15. This argument rests on the assumption that in any given year the 
same number of lobsters will be caught regardless of whether they are 
caught in July, August, September or in other months.
Closed seasons have not worked well in fisheries except in special 
circumstances, and therefore it is with great hesitancy that we even 
raise the issue. However, it might be a worthwhile experiment to close 
the coast for all or a part of the summer season.^
16. The institutional barriers to this suggestion are, of course, very 
large, i.e. the fishermen themselves and especially the dealers who buy 
at the summer price to stock their pounds. One reason the price rose to 
its highest point ever in the spring of 1959 was that the colder summer of 
1958 and introduction of the larger size measure reduced the catch in July, 
August, and September of 1958. The increase in the minimum size probably 
excluded from the catch about ten per cent by number and eight to nine per 
cent by weight. On the basis of a six million pound catch in July and 
August, this amounted to one-half million pounds. As a result the price 
stayed around fifty cents a pound all summer, and there was much less 
"pounding" than usual. The dealers, being reluctant to stock inventory 
at that price, regretted this action when the price was over $1.50 a pound 
in the spring of 1959.
Short of closing the season, other "reasonable" barriers to entry (for 
instance, higher license fees or a monthly summer quota) might help even out 
the seasonal variations somewhat and partially protect the full-time fisher­
man from the impact of today's undue ease of entry.^
17. A monthly summer quota, of course, would present various administrative 
problems.
Economies of scale which might create some barriers to entry are ap­
parently unimportant in the lobster fishery. There is no advantage and 
there is a cost disadvantage in using boats larger than about forty feet.
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Traps inust all be pulled individually, except for trawl set traps, and 
one boat can only economically pull, bait, and lower so many traps a day.
18. The question of the optimum size for a boat is complex, i.e. the winter 
offshore fishery should use boats 60 to 65 feet using two-men crews. Boats 
this size, however, are awkward and expensive in the inshore fishery in the 
summer.
Further investment in warp (rope) and the possibility of loss prevent the
extension of the fishery to too great a depth. The loss of traps is large
during storms. Some fishermen estimate that they lose twenty-five per cent 
19per year.
19. Dragging may be carried on at greater depths, but to be successful 
must be carried on in areas of high population density, and on the type 
of bottom preferred by lobsters. Furthermore, dragging involves high 
operating costs and it creates its own storage and handling problems.
20So it would appear that the fishery will remain an individual operation.
20. The cost of rearing lobsters is also prohibitive.
With all these factors mitigating against the lobster fisherman, he 
(the competent full-time fisherman) remains reasonably well off. In part 
the replacement of capital in this industry has taken place via a lower, 
or at least a different, standard of living for the fisherman. The geographic 
isolation, the history of taste, the social differentiation, have meant in 
the past a greater willingness to accept substandard housing, medical care, 
etc.
However, reduced consumption is only part of the explanation of the
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ability to replace capital. The inelastic nature of demand for a signifi­
cant portion of the catch has in recent years resulted in reasonable annual 
earnings for the full-time fishermen. However, the earnings of the fisher­
men do not approach what they might be if the fishery were exploited more 
rationally and the product was better marketed. It is the innate feeling 
of this great disparity between what is and what could be that troubles 
the coastal people.
